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The concept of public service broadcasting is for many people summed up by the
mission given to the BBC by its first Director General, John Reith, in the 1920s: to
‘inform, educate and entertain’.  This broad statement encompasses several elements,
some clearly appealing to viewers themselves (to entertain), others with wider social
purposes (to educate and inform).1, 2  The aims of public service broadcasting would
therefore appear to encompass two main strands: that television should give people
the programmes that they want to watch, and that it should also satisfy wider social
purposes such as education and the promotion of ‘citizenship’.  Reflecting these
strands, in this chapter we discuss two broad questions concerning the provision of
television broadcasting:3
• Will the television broadcasting market give people what they want to watch?
• Should people be allowed to watch only what they want to watch?
The first question investigates the traditional ‘market failure’ arguments for public
intervention in broadcasting.  These hold that the commercial broadcasting market
will fail to meet viewers’ demands in a number of important respects.  Advertising-
funded broadcasters will produce a bland diet of low quality programmes, appealing
to mass market tastes and ignoring niche interests.  We explore the basis for these
arguments by assessing market provision of television broadcasting.  Specifically, we
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1 The UK government has suggested expanding the BBC’s mission statement with five distinctive
purposes: ‘sustaining citizenship and civil society; promoting education and learning; stimulating
creativity and cultural excellence; representing the UK, its Nations, regions and communities; and
bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK’.  See DCMS (2005), page 5.
2 Similar social purposes are found in PSB systems of other countries.  The PSB Charter for
Ireland’s Radio Telifis Éireann (RTÉ) includes among its guiding principles ‘the democratic,
social and cultural values of Irish society’.  NZ On Air, the funding body for PSB in New Zealand,
states as its mission, ‘to reflect and foster the development of New Zealand culture and identity
through broadcasting’.
3 This chapter discusses television rather than radio.  Some of the arguments we present do not
apply to the latter medium: since subscription is rarely used for radio, the practical choice is
2consider whether audience numbers will be efficient; whether the level of advertising
is appropriate; and whether the right mix of programmes, in terms of diversity and
quality of content, will be produced.
The second question relates to issues that go beyond the desires of the individual
viewer.  It encompasses two broad concerns. First, that (some) viewers do not
necessarily choose what it is in their own best interests to watch.  Secondly, television
viewing may have effects on the wider population that are ignored by the individual
viewer (this is sometimes described as the ‘citizen’ rationale for PSB4).  The first
concern might justify controls on the broadcasting of certain harmful content,
especially to protect children, while the latter would provide a basis for intervention to
promote socially beneficial programmes and to restrict those causing social detriment.
We examine the possible foundations of these concerns and their relevance in the
modern broadcasting environment.
It is particularly important to subject the basis for public intervention in television to
rigorous economic analysis at the present time.  The sector is changing enormously
due to the adoption of digital technologies.  Digital signals relax spectrum constraints,
greatly increasing the number of channels that can be broadcast.  Encryption
technologies facilitate charging of viewers, rather than (just) advertisers, making
commercial broadcasters directly responsive to viewer demands.  In addition, devices
such as the personal video recorder (PVR) give viewers greater control over what they
watch.  These developments have critical and wide-ranging impacts on television
broadcasting.
In light of these developments, the rationale for public intervention needs to be re-
examined.  Regulation that was appropriate to the earlier, analogue era may become
unnecessary, and even undesirable,5 in the digital world.  Although everyone would
presumably agree that the mission to ‘inform, educate and entertain’ is a highly
laudable one, and in this sense supports public service broadcasting,6 it needs to be
questioned whether public intervention is still required to fulfil these aims.  As was
well expressed by Gavyn Davies (who subsequently served as chairman of the BBC
from 2001 to 2004):7
‘some form of market failure must lie at the heart of any concept of public
service broadcasting.  Beyond simply using the catch-phrase that public
service broadcasting must “inform, educate and entertain”, we must add
“inform, educate and entertain in a way which the private sector, left
                                                                                                                                           
between public and advertising funding, and the latter gives rise to a number of market failures
(see Section 3). 
4 See Ofcom (2004a), page 9.
5 In particular, the presence in the market of a large, publicly funded broadcaster creates distortions
to competition, arguably reducing the market’s effectiveness in meeting viewer demands.
6 See, for example, Ofcom (2004a), page 48.
7 See Davies (1999), page 10.
3unregulated, would not do”.  Otherwise, why not leave matters entirely to the
private sector?’
We argue that digital broadcasting greatly mitigates traditional market failures and, in
this context, the market will give people broadly what they want to watch.  In this
sense, the ‘market failure’ basis for public service broadcasting falls away.  A
coherent rationale remains for more limited intervention to control the broadcasting of
harmful material, and to promote educational and other programmes generating social
benefits. 
The implementation of public service broadcasting also calls for re-examination in
light of digital broadcasting.  Funding sources for existing systems of provision come
under serious pressure in the digital world, threatening their long-term viability.  At
the very least, these systems need to adapt to survive.  Moreover, in this world of
viewer sovereignty, with a vast and varied range of programmes to choose from, the
ability of ‘worthy’ public service content to gain audience attention is greatly
diminished.  This challenge calls for more innovative techniques to be used in
reaching viewers, if public service messages are to be conveyed.  An alternative view
is that, given declining benefits and major costs of intervention, the time has now
arrived when wide-ranging intervention is no longer appropriate.
The chapter proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we describe the structure and
characteristics of the broadcasting industry.  Section 3 investigates the first question
posed above: will the market give people what they want to watch?  Section 4
explores the second question: should people be allowed to watch only what they
want?  Alternative systems of provision are described in Section 5.  Drawing on this
analysis, we then assess the rationale for, and provision of, public service
broadcasting in the analogue era (Section 6) and in the digital world (Section 7).  A
case study of the UK’s system of provision and challenges for its future is given in
Section 8.  Section 9 concludes with a set of messages for students, researchers and
policymakers.
2. The broadcasting industry
The broadcasting industry consists of a number of vertical stages, by means of which
television programming is created, packaged and transmitted to viewers, and revenue
is generated.  Broadcasters are typically vertically integrated,8 with some outsourcing
of programme production.
The four main elements of the broadcasting supply chain can be described as follows:
• programme production, e.g. making a movie or drama, filming a sports event,
and news reporting;
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4• channel packaging: scheduling programmes into channels, packages and pay-
per-view offerings;
• transmission to the viewer via terrestrial, satellite, cable or other platforms; 
• revenue generation through licence fee collection, subscription and/or the sale
of advertising airtime.
We examine the features of each stage in turn.
Programme production
Programme production incurs costs that do not vary with the number of viewers: once
a programme has been created, it can in principle be viewed by an unlimited number
of viewers.  Television content is highly differentiated, consisting of a wide range of
programme types (or ‘genres’) such as news and current affairs, documentaries,
coverage of sports and cultural events, movies, dramas, comedies, and so on.
Production of higher quality programmes typically incurs greater expenditure (e.g.
better special effects in movies, authentic period dramas, comprehensive news
reporting), though production costs also vary considerably between genres.9
Channel packaging
Individual programmes are usually packaged into channels that are broadcast as a
continuous television feed.  A channel might focus on a single type of programming
that appeals to a specific interest group, or it may contain a range of genres.  Channels
may themselves be combined into packages (or ‘bouquets’) that are supplied as a
bundle.  Alternatively, programmes may also be shown on a ‘pay-per-view’ basis
rather as part of a channel.
In the future programme downloads from the Internet may become a popular viewing
method.  Video download departs from the traditional model of ‘linear’ broadcasting
by giving the viewer, rather than broadcaster, control over the timing of reception.  In
this case the role of channel packaging, as such, becomes redundant since the viewer,
rather than the provider, determines the selection and timing of viewed content.
Instead, the organisation and presentation of content libraries becomes an important
role for providers.10
Transmission
Programmes can be transmitted to the viewer using many technologies.  Historically
in the UK and many other countries, radio and television broadcasters used terrestrial
                                                
9 The cost per hour of BBC-originated programmes is highest (and by a large margin) for drama,
followed by film, sport and entertainment.  Relatively cheap programme genres are news and
weather, followed by children’s programmes (including education).  From BBC Annual Report
and Accounts 2004/2005, Broadcasting facts and figures, Table 18. 
10 This phenomenon can already be seen for music, with the growth of websites such as iTunes and
Napster.
5(airwave) transmission,11 but recent decades have seen the emergence of cable and
satellite distribution platforms.  Analogue broadcasting requires each channel to have
a dedicated frequency band.  In digital broadcasting signals are converted into a
digital format and, by means of compression and multiplexing techniques, this allows
many more channels to be transmitted in the same bandwidth.  Broadband networks,
based on fixed or mobile telephone connections or emerging wireless technologies,
may be used to deliver services similar to broadcasting (e.g. video downloads).  With
the growth of broadband, the traditional nature of broadcasting as a one-way, one-to-
many, passive activity is likely to become increasingly interactive and personalised.
Transmission systems have substantial set-up costs, to build the transmission network
and enable viewers’ reception capability.12  Once infrastructure is in place, costs do
not increase significantly with the number of programmes delivered, consisting only
of the power required to broadcast the signal.  Moreover, once broadcast, a signal can
be picked up by anyone with the necessary receiving equipment: there is no
incremental cost of transmitting a programme to an additional viewer.  The viewer
makes an initial investment in receiving equipment, after which no additional cost is
incurred in receiving further broadcasts.  Effective transmission capacity varies with
signal type.  Analogue transmission is relatively inefficient in its use of spectrum,13
placing a tight constraint on the number of programmes that can be broadcast
simultaneously, while digital signals are much more efficient.
Revenue generation
In principle, four methods of revenue generation may be used to fund broadcasting
activities:
• direct government grant funded from taxation;
• a compulsory licence fee levied on all television viewers;14
• direct viewer charges on a subscription or pay-per-view basis (‘pay-TV’); and 
• the sale of airtime to advertisers.
Broadcasting services funded from a licence fee or the sale of advertising alone are
often described as ‘free-to-air’.  Government grants draw on funds raised from a wide
tax base, but the amount given will be subject to political acceptability and budgetary
                                                
11 Though for a period in the UK wire broadcasting was also used for radio; see Coase (1948).
12 Terrestrial transmission requires a network of transmission sites, with masts and antenna systems,
and the viewer must install an aerial.  Satellite transmission uses transponders to broadcast the
signal, while viewers need a dish and set-top box to pick this up and convert it for viewing.  Cable
transmission requires a cable to be laid to each viewer’s premises.  In each case the viewer must
also purchase a television set. 
13 Spectrum is the relevant resource for terrestrial transmission.  In satellite transmission transponder
capacity may become constrained, while cable capacity is the relevant factor in cable transmission.
We refer to spectrum scarcity throughout, although it should be borne in mind that other resources
may be the limiting factor for alternative transmission methods.
14 In the UK this is a flat-rate charge per household levied for possession of television-receiving
equipment, and is set at £126.50 per annum in 2005-06 (for a colour TV).
6priorities.  Throughout this chapter we mostly ignore government grants as a source of
funding for broadcasting.  
A licence fee appears straightforward but, in the absence of an effective exclusion
mechanism, incurs significant enforcement costs.15  Pay-TV requires the installation
of a conditional access system to exclude non-payers: the signal is broadcast in an
encrypted format, and authorised viewers use a set-top box (STB) containing a
decoder (or ‘smart card’) to convert it for viewing.16  Subscriber acquisition and
management services, including a sophisticated billing system for levying charges
that vary according to the channels taken, must also be set up.
Television advertising is a two-sided market in which the broadcaster shows attractive
programming to draw in viewers, and access to this audience is sold to advertisers and
sponsors.  Although viewers may receive the programmes for free, they must tolerate,
and be responsive to, advertisements placed between and within programmes.
Disutility from the presence of adverts can be regarded as the implicit ‘price’ to
viewers of advertising funded broadcasting.  Viewers can adopt a number of measures
to reduce this disutility: switching channel during advertising breaks—the invention
of the remote control was a major step in this direction—or skipping adverts during
playback from a VCR.  The ability to eliminate adverts is further heightened by the
invention of the personal video recorder (PVR, sometimes known by the brand name
‘TiVo’).  This is a new type of recording device offering high quality recording, much
larger capacity and greater sophistication than the VCR.17  Such avoidance behaviour,
however, reduces the impact of adverts and, if widespread, ultimately undermines the
sale of advertising airtime as a source of funding for broadcasters.18
3. Will the market give people what they want to watch?
In this section we address the question, ‘will market provision give people the
programmes they want to watch?’  There are several aspects to this.  First, taking the
set of programmes as given, will the efficient level of viewing be achieved?  Revenue
is needed to cover broadcasters’ production and transmission costs, and so must be
generated somehow, while viewing is sensitive to the method used.  In Section 3.1 we
assess the efficiency of market outcomes, considering in turn the television licence
                                                
15 In the UK the BBC’s collection costs amounted to £152m in 2004-05; additional court costs are
not quantified.  Its success is mixed, with evasion estimated at 5.0% at March 2005, resulting in a
total cost to the BBC of 10.2% of revenue.  From BBC Annual Report and Accounts 2004/2005,
Financial review.
16 As well as facilitating charging, encryption can prevent the inadvertent viewing of unwanted
channels and (perhaps with the addition of a PIN mechanism) provides parents with a reliable
mechanism to prevent children having access to unsuitable material.  
17 Programmes are recorded onto a hard disk rather than a tape, allowing the viewer to record many
more programmes and to move between them easily as with a CD or DVD.  The PVR also has
flexible viewing capabilities, allowing the viewer to pause and then resume viewing from the same
point even while the programme is being broadcast.
18 See Wilbur (2004) for an analysis of PVR use on advertising revenue and broadcasting.
7fee, advertising funding and pay-TV.  A strand of this analysis concerns advertising:
advertisers, as well as viewers, are consumers of television services, and the two sides
of the market are interdependent although not always aligned in their interests. 
Viewer and social welfare are affected by the level of advertising as well as
programme viewing, thus both aspects must be assessed.
Turning next to production, we examine whether this is likely to be efficient.  For
production of a programme to be efficient the surplus it generates must exceed its
cost.  In Section 3.2 we note the role played by market prices in this context.  A
further aspect is whether the market will deliver the ‘right’ set of programmes, in
terms of diversity and quality, that viewers want to watch.  In Section 3.3 we examine
programme selection under alternative funding systems to assess the diversity of
genres produced in each case.  Quality provision and investment in innovation are
assessed in Section 3.4.
Throughout this section market outcomes are assessed against viewers’ own demands,
ignoring any effects of television viewing beyond the individual viewer.  Thus, ‘social
optimality’ refers here to outcomes that maximise viewers’ own utility in the absence
of externalities.  In addition, the viewer is taken to be capable of determining what is
in his or her own interests and making this selection for themselves; thus the possible
concern that (some) viewers do not choose what is in their best interests to watch is
ignored.  These two issues are deferred until Section 4.
3.1 Charging and consumption
As described above, the broadcasting industry is characterised by substantial fixed
costs while marginal, per-viewer costs are negligible.  Programme production costs
are independent of the number of viewers and, once transmission and reception
capacity are in place, the marginal cost of transmitting the programme to an additional
viewer is zero.  Television viewing is a non-rivalrous form of consumption: viewing
by one individual leaves unaffected the ability of others to view the same output.
These characteristics are fundamental to the economics of broadcasting, with
important implications for efficient production and consumption.
Efficient viewing of programmes
Once produced, allocative efficiency dictates that a programme should be viewed by
all individuals whose consumption generates positive surplus.  Since an existing
programme can be supplied to an additional viewer at no incremental cost, this
requires the programme to be provided to all viewers with a positive valuation of it,
however small.  Such an outcome can be achieved by setting the price of viewing
equal to marginal cost—i.e. at zero.  At this price all individuals with a positive
valuation view the programme and consumption is at the efficient level.  A source of
revenue is needed, however, since production and transmission costs must somehow
be covered for the industry to be viable.  Appeals to allocative efficiency are often
8used to support funding in the form of a licence fee, or out of the public purse (though
taxation elsewhere typically also creates distortions).
However, the zero price argument applies only to an existing set of programmes.  It
ignores the effect of such a policy on the incentive to develop desirable programmes
in the future.  A production function with high fixed and very low marginal costs is
found in many other creative and innovative industries—books, software and
pharmaceuticals, for example—yet these products are not supplied at marginal cost.
Marginal cost pricing (even with a subsidy to cover fixed costs) gives poor incentives
for high quality provision, innovation and cost efficiency.  Balancing these arguments,
some means of revenue generation must be found that minimises allocative
inefficiency while also allowing costs to be covered and providing good incentives to
producers.
Efficient level of advertising
The issue of allocative efficiency also arises on the advertising side of the market.
However, the interests of advertisers and viewers are somewhat opposed.  Advertisers
benefit from the viewing of their advertisements, while viewers typically suffer some
disutility from the disruption and delay imposed on the viewing of their desired
programme.  
The extent to which advertiser surplus enters into the social welfare function is
important here.  The welfare effect of advertising is a contentious issue.  Advertising
may be designed to provide information, change preferences or steal business from
rivals, and the welfare assessment varies according to its purpose.  In the case of
informative advertising without business stealing, the advertiser’s surplus should
count fully in social welfare.  Then, if an advertiser is willing to pay an amount w per
viewer to reach an audience while each viewer incurs a disutility d from the presence
of the advert, the advert should be provided whenever w exceeds d.  If this condition
is violated allocative inefficiency arises on the advertising side of the market.  If
advertising is socially wasteful, on the other hand, welfare depends on viewer surplus
plus broadcaster profits.
We now assess the efficiency of alternative methods of revenue generation, taking
account of both viewing and advertising levels.
Television licence fee
Once the licence fee has been paid any programme may be viewed at no further
charge.19  The fact that viewing is free at the point of consumption is often taken to
                                                
19 The same is also true for subscription channels, though not for pay-per-view.  The difference
between the licence fee and subscription is the size of the bundle of channels—with the licence fee
covering all television (even if its revenues are given to a single broadcaster)—and the compulsory
nature of the licence fee.
9entail that allocative efficiency is always achieved.  However, allocative inefficiency
may nonetheless arise in a number of ways.  
The licence fee excludes consumption of all television services by individuals whose
willingness to pay for television as a whole is less than this amount (and who do not
simply evade the fee).  Although this could in principle be a source of allocative
inefficiency, almost universal coverage implies that such exclusion is not significant
in practice (and some of those who choose not to have a television set may actively
dislike television, thus their failure to watch is not inefficient).
More significant inefficiency can arise if a commercial broadcaster (say, pay-TV20)
operates alongside the licence fee funded (public) broadcaster.  The uptake and
revenues of pay-TV are likely to be distorted, to the detriment of social welfare.  Note
that this would also be the case if the public broadcaster’s channels were provided for
free (e.g. if it is funded from taxation): even the availability of public television
affects viewer choices, to the detriment of commercial operators.21
An individual who wants to watch any television—even pay-TV alone—must pay the
licence fee.  This alters her choice set by removing the option of taking only pay-TV.
If choices were unconstrained, the pay-TV operator would gain a subscription from
any viewer whose valuation of its offering, taken either on its own or in addition to
the public channels, exceeds its subscription charge.  But with a compulsory licence
fee the viewer’s choice is restricted to either paying the licence fee and watching only
public channels, or paying a subscription charge in addition to the licence fee and
having both services.  With this constrained choice, the viewer subscribes to pay-TV
only if her net surplus from the second option exceeds that of the first.
Some simple representations of preferences and choices are given in Box 1.  The first
example suggests that subscription to pay-TV may be inefficiently low in the presence
of the compulsory licence fee.  In the second example, subscription is unaffected but
the licence fee diverts part of the viewer’s surplus to the public broadcaster.  In fact,
the actual situation may be more complicated than this, since the subscription charge
is likely to be lower when the pay-TV operator faces the compulsory licence fee.22  If
so, pay-TV revenue (as well as viewer surplus) is diverted to the public broadcaster.23
                                                
20 A similar analysis can be applied to an advertising funded broadcaster, where the ‘price’ of its
service is the time spent watching adverts on its channels.  
21 As an analogy, consider the case of free newspapers on trains.  Knowing that this is freely
available, a traveller is less likely to buy another newspaper even if this is actually preferred.
22 The level of the licence fee may also be different in the two scenarios.  Terrington and Dollar
(2005) argue that if the licence fee were voluntary, it would have to be increased to offset the fall
in uptake.  This is a pessimistic counter-factual, however, since the public broadcaster would have
an incentive to price its services efficiently, implying that not all viewers pay more, and might
operate more efficiently if it had to compete for subscribers, reducing the costs it needed to cover.
23 If the commercial broadcaster were instead advertising funded, a similar analysis would imply that
viewing time devoted to its channels, and hence the broadcaster’s revenue, is inefficiently low.
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With lower revenue and tougher competition for viewers, it is likely that the output
and quality of programming offered by pay-TV will be lower.24
  Box 1: Pay-TV and the licence fee
Case (i): Exclusion of pay-TV
Consider a situation in which a single pay-TV operator (for simplicity) offers a single bundle
of channels.  Suppose that a viewer’s ranking of net surplus (gross surplus minus the
relevant charges) is given by:
   ( ) ( ) ( ) 0            >−−+>−>− PLpaypublicSLpublicSPpayS
where S(.) denotes gross surplus from viewing public and/or pay-TV, P is the subscription
charge for pay-TV and L is the licence fee. This viewer prefers pay-TV to the public
broadcaster’s service, and has diminishing marginal utility of additional channels such that it
is even less desirable for him to take both services given the charges involved.
The viewer’s unconstrained choice would be to take pay-TV alone.  But with the compulsory
licence fee this choice is unavailable.  Since his incremental valuation of pay-TV is
negative—i.e. his net surplus from taking both services is less than that of having the public
broadcaster’s channels alone—he will not subscribe to pay-TV.
Case (ii): Diversion of surplus
Suppose that a viewer has a strong preference for pay-TV and a negative net surplus from
public broadcasting, such that:
   ( ) ( ) ( ) LpublicSPLpaypublicSPpayS −>>−−+>−     0        .
Again, the unconstrained choice would be pay-TV alone; but the constrained choice is to
take pay-TV in addition to public broadcasting.  The viewer pays the licence fee simply in
order to take pay-TV, even though her valuation of the public broadcaster’s output implies
that this would not be chosen under a voluntary system.  Part of the viewer’s surplus is
diverted to the public broadcaster, even though her net valuation of its channels is negative.
Advertising funding
Advertising funding avoids the need to levy subscription or licence fees on viewers to
cover broadcasting costs.  In the direct, monetary sense the price of a programme
equals its marginal cost and allocative efficiency would appear to be achieved.
However, advertising imposes on viewers a kind of ‘hedonic’ price given by their
disutility from seeing adverts.  Viewers must tolerate advertisements placed between
and within programmes, imposing on them the disutility of disruption and delay.
Given that the programmes have already been made and could be viewed without
interruption, this is inefficient from the viewers’ perspective.  When transmission
capacity is limited, advertising takes up valuable airtime that could otherwise be used
to show more desirable programming.25
                                                
24 This may explain why the pay-TV sector has so far failed (in the view of some) to provide more
diverse, high-quality programmes.
25 Advertising may be enjoyable to some viewers; if so, this should be taken into account in
calculating the net cost of advertising.
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To the extent that broadcasters have market power over providing access to their
audience, advertising rates may be set above the efficient level; but this is not
necessarily so.  Anderson and Coate (2005) analyse whether too much or too little
advertising is supplied in equilibrium, for both free-to-air and pay-TV.26  In the case
of free-to-air, the welfare outcome is ambiguous: advertising may be either over-
provided (if its nuisance cost is high) or under-provided (if this cost is low).27  As the
market for viewers becomes competitive, advertising may be under-provided since
broadcasters compete for viewers by lowering advertising levels.
If viewers can avoid advertisements, e.g. by switching channel or using recording
devices to skip over them, the scope for inefficiency is greater.  A viewer will avoid
adverts as long as the average cost incurred in doing so is less than d, the disutility of
watching adverts.  Even if the value to advertisers of viewer attention exceeds d, and
advertisers would therefore be willing to compensate viewers for their disutility, no
effective mechanism exists to pay viewers to watch.  If widespread, avoidance
behaviour could undermine advertising as a funding source for commercial television.
The only viable advertising strategies would then be ones that are intertwined with the
programme itself, e.g. programme sponsorship, product placement and advertisements
captured by the programme (e.g. logos on Formula 1 cars, billboards in football
stadiums).
Pay-TV
With conditional access, viewers may be charged directly for their consumption.
However, even if feasible, direct viewer charges at the level necessary to recoup
broadcasting costs may exclude a number of individuals whose consumption would
be efficient.  In particular uniform average cost pricing, levied on a per-programme or
per-channel basis, could be expected to exclude many viewers.
Price discrimination is the key to combining fixed cost recovery through viewer
charging with relatively efficient consumption.  By charging different amounts to
heterogeneous viewers, reflecting individual willingness to pay, surplus can be
extracted from high valuation viewers to cover fixed costs while achieving (close to)
the efficient level of consumption.28  Perfect (or first degree) price discrimination
achieves allocative efficiency, but its implementation requires the supplier to know
each viewer’s willingness to pay, to be able to set charges individually, and to prevent
resale.  These conditions are rarely met in practice and instead mechanisms must be
                                                
26 This model involves informative advertising, and assumes that each viewer watches a single
channel over the relevant time horizon.
27 If advertising is over-provided by commercial broadcasters this could be restricted by imposing a
ceiling on the amount of airtime that may be devoted to advertising (as occurs in the EU under the
Television Without Frontiers directive) or by providing advertising-free channels (such as those of
a publicly funded broadcaster).
28 Coase (1946) advocates multi-part tariffs—a form of price discrimination—as a solution to the
marginal cost controversy.
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found by which to identify groups of viewers with different valuations (third degree
price discrimination) or to induce them to self-select between different charging
schemes (second degree price discrimination).  
Price discrimination in broadcasting is typically achieved by two means: ‘windowing’
and channel bundling.  Windowing, whereby a movie or other content is released
through a sequence of distribution outlets at successively lower prices, is a form of
intertemporal price discrimination.  Viewers with a strong preference for seeing a
movie immediately, who tend to value the programme more highly than other
individuals, pay a high price to see it at the cinema, while less time-sensitive viewers
view it later at a lower price through video release or on television.  Pay-per-view,
pay-TV and free-to-air broadcasting each form a separate stage in this process.
Windowing allows surplus to be extracted while most viewers with positive
valuations view the programme eventually.  Nevertheless, a real form of allocative
inefficiency remains: there is no additional cost to providing the programme to
everyone immediately, yet delay is imposed on many viewers.
The packaging of individual programmes into a channel supplied as a single offering
is a form of product bundling, as is the combining of several channels into a bouquet.
Pure bundling occurs when two or more products are supplied only as a bundle.29
Mixed bundling allows the components also to be sold separately, but the price of the
bundle gives a discount on the sum of component prices.  ‘Tiering’—a form of mixed
bundling in which channel are supplied as a hierarchy of packages between which
subscribers select—is commonly used by pay-TV operators.
When two or more channels are supplied and viewer valuations are heterogeneous,
channel bundling can be used as a price discrimination device to improve allocative
efficiency.30  A simple, two channel example of pricing and consumption with no
bundling, pure bundling and mixed bundling is given in Box 2; this demonstrates how
bundling may improve allocative efficiency, as well as facilitating channel provision.
The key mechanism underlying bundling is that the dispersion in valuations across
viewers is lower for the bundle than for an individual channel.  This is especially true
if component values are negatively correlated, as in Box 2, but holds even for
independent and positively correlated distributions.  The benefits of bundling increase
as the number of channels rises, due to the homogenising effect of the ‘Law of Large
Numbers’.  When the number of channels is large, pure bundling may achieve
(almost) universal consumption while also covering the costs of channel provision.31
                                                
29 In a sense, the TV licence fee could be regarded as the price of a pure bundle covering all
television viewing.
30 For literature on the use of price discrimination to reduce allocative inefficiency see Adams and
Yellen (1976), McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989), Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and
Brynjolfsson (1999).
31 Such as for the licence fee when there are no other broadcasters; see earlier in this section.
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Mixed bundling increases the number of instruments available to the broadcaster and
hence increases its revenue compared with pure bundling.32  The welfare comparison
between pure and mixed bundling is ambiguous.  A danger inherent in pure bundling
schemes is that individuals may inefficiently consume some components that they
value at less than cost.33  With the marginal cost of supply equal to zero, however, this
inefficiency does not arise in broadcasting.  One the other hand, mixed bundling may
induce viewers to select smaller bundles (perhaps even a single channel) while
forgoing channels for which they have a small but positive valuation; if so, allocative
efficiency will be lower than under pure bundling.34  For this reason schemes that are
closer to pure bundling, consisting of large packages and with few channels made
available individually, are a particularly efficient form of pricing in the broadcasting
industry.35
       Box 2: Channel bundling
Suppose that two television channels, 1 and 2, can be supplied by a monopoly broadcaster
to three viewers, A, B and C.  The per-channel cost of production and transmission is £10,
but once this is incurred the marginal cost of supplying an additional viewer is zero. Viewer
valuations of the channels are shown in the table below; if an individual receives both
channels the combined valuation is simply the sum of component valuations.  For each
channel the sum of viewer valuations exceeds its cost, thus provision of both channels is
socially desirable. With all viewers having positive valuations of viewing each channel,
allocative efficiency is achieved through universal consumption.
Denoting the prices of the individual channels as P1 and P2 respectively and the price of the
bundle as PB, profit-maximising prices can be calculated for three cases: no bundling, pure
bundling and mixed bundling.  Together with the sales of each channel (Q1, Q2), revenue
raised and consumer surplus (CS) generated, these prices are as follows:
   •    no bundling:   P1 = P2 = £7;  Q1 = Q2 = 2;  revenue = £28;  CS = £5
   •    pure bundling:   PB = £10;  Q1 = Q2 = 3;  revenue = £30;  CS = £5
   •    mixed bundling:   P1 = £10, P2 = £9, PB = £14;  Q1 = Q2 = 2;  revenue = £33;  CS = 0.
                                                
32 At worst, the pure bundling outcome can be replicated in a mixed bundling scheme by setting very
high component prices.
33 Adams and Yellen (1976) raise this possibility, noting that the ‘exclusion’ of such inefficient
consumption is a desirable property of a mixed bundling scheme.
34 If channel production costs are very high, however, mixed bundling may be necessary to generate
sufficient revenue to ensure provision.
35 Although this tends to be disliked by viewers who feel that they are forced to pay for programmes
that they do not watch.  Although understandable, this perception is based on the incorrect
assumption that the sum of individual component prices (were these to be offered) would equal the
price of the bundle, while economic principles tell us that bundles offer a discount on the sum of
stand-alone prices.
  Channel 1 Channel 2 
Viewer A  £10 £1 
Viewer  B  £1 £9  
Viewer  C  £7 £7 
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Pure bundling achieves allocative efficiency: each channel is consumed by all three viewers.
Mixed bundling and no bundling, however, do not (in this case) achieve allocative efficiency. 
Bundling raises broadcaster revenues, with mixed bundling extracting the most consumer
surplus (here, all of it) and yielding the highest revenue.  With a larger channel cost bundling
may be necessary to ensure provision.  If the per-channel cost is raised to £15, the firm
cannot break even without some form of bundling.  With a cost of £16 per channel, mixed
bundling is then necessary.
In Box 2 it is assumed that the channel provider is a monopolist.  In a monopoly
context, bundling increases profits compared with pure component pricing.  In
competitive situations, however, this result may no longer hold.  In a duopoly model
of compatibility and bundling of complementary goods, Matutes and Regibeau (1992)
show that bundling can act to reduce profits since it intensifies price competition.
Strategic use of bundling is possible: for example, in the face of competitive entry
bundling can be an exclusionary device.36  In a competitive broadcasting market the
analysis of channel bundling is far from straightforward.37
When pay-TV broadcasters sell advertising airtime as well as levying charges to
viewers, fewer adverts are shown compared to a pure advertising regime.38  Thus,
advertisers are worse off under pay-TV, though viewers may benefit.  In a model of
informative advertising, Anderson and Coate (2005) show that advertising is under-
provided by pay-TV.  The reason being that, in their model, viewers watch a single
channel, giving channels a monopoly over providing access to their viewers.  The
model in Appendix 1 shows that advertising avoidance behaviour (e.g. skipping
adverts using a PVR) in a pay-TV regime typically makes viewers worse off, as they
pay a higher subscription charge that outweighs the benefit to them of avoiding
adverts.
3.2 Programme production and asymmetric information
In the preceding discussion the set of programmes was taken as given, considering
only the need to cover programme costs which were treated as fixed.  We now go
back a stage and ask whether production will be efficient.  We start by noting the role
of the price mechanism in revealing hidden information about viewer preferences.
We then turn to the questions of diversity, quality and innovation. 
In general terms, a good should not be produced unless total surplus generated
exceeds its production costs.  Each viewer’s valuation is known to the individual
themselves but unknown to the producer; in other words, viewer valuations are
asymmetric information.  In a typical market the price mechanism reveals much of
this hidden information: by purchasing the good at a given price, consumers reveal
                                                
36 See Whinston (1990).  For a survey of the literature on bundling, see Nalebuff (2003). 
37 In 2002 the UK Office of Fair Trading investigated BSkyB’s mixed bundling its of premium
channels (among other concerns); for the conclusions of this investigation see BSkyB: The outcome
of the OFT’s Competition Act investigation, Office of Fair Trading, December 2002.
38 This result is found in the model in Appendix 1.
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that their valuations are at least this amount.  Since production is not profitable unless
revenues exceed costs, inefficient over-production is avoided, although efficient
production may not always take place (unless price discrimination is close to perfect).
In pay-TV, viewer charges reveal information about viewers’ preferences, assisting
efficient production decisions.39  In free-to-air broadcasting, however, this guide to
viewer preferences is lacking.40  Viewer surveys might be conducted instead.41
However, such results are inferior to market data: questionnaires pose artificial
choices, while market transactions are real ones, and statements about programme
desirability are costless to make.  Viewing patterns may reveal some information
about relative valuations: analysis of choices between head-to-head combinations can
yield some programme rankings.  Even so, without an indication of willingness to pay
the broadcaster cannot determine whether surplus generated by a programme exceeds
its cost of provision and hence whether its production is efficient.
3.3 Diversity of programmes
Television content is a highly differentiated product class, including sports coverage,
news and current affairs, movies, comedies, documentaries and so on.  Viewer tastes
are heterogeneous, with preferences differing across individuals and each viewer
typically enjoying many genres.  Provision of a diverse range of programme genres,
other things being equal, tends to raise viewer surplus.  Diversity in broadcasting is
also important for the political process, with expression of a plurality of opinions
being vital to the functioning of democratic systems.42  
Market provision of diversity depends on the means of revenue generation, as this
may give broadcasters an incentive either to focus on a limited number of tastes or to
differentiate themselves across a range of genres.  Outcomes under pay-TV and
                                                
39 Pay-per-view gives a direct measure of viewers’ willingness to pay for individual programmes.
Bundling, both of programmes into channels and of channels into packages, may obscure the
valuations of particular programmes.  However, in pay-TV a channel typically focuses on a single
genre, implying that valuations of programmes within that channel do not differ greatly from that
of the channel as a whole.  Moreover, experimentation with channel and package contents allows
the values of various programme genres to be estimated.
40 Coase (1946) notes this problem in the absence of a pricing system.
41 This is relevant to the BBC, which levies no viewer charges (leaving aside the licence fee).
DCMS (2005) proposes that the BBC Trust should measure audience opinion by means of
quantitative and qualitative research, viewer consultation though e.g. elected regional Broadcasting
Councils, open meetings, e-forums and research among ‘representative groups’ of viewers and
listeners.
42 With a limited number of channels plurality of opinions can be sustained only if several
viewpoints are put forward within each channel.  This is reflected in the PSB obligation in the UK
and elsewhere to provide comprehensive and balanced coverage of news and current affairs.  No
requirement of this nature is imposed on printed media, where the multiplicity of newspapers can
represent a variety of views (although the tendency of people to read a single newspaper implies
that a given individual will not necessarily receive diverse opinions).
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advertising funding have been studied at length by economists.  We summarise these
findings next.43
Advertising funding
With pure advertising funding the broadcaster’s aim is to maximise audience size, as
this increases advertising revenues, while the amount of surplus accruing to viewers is
unimportant.44  Steiner (1952) assesses provision of diversity by competing single-
channel broadcasters in a market with a set of distinct programme types, each with a
distinct set of viewers.  Welfare is maximised by having just one channel per genre,
up to the point where the number of channels equals the number of genres.  If two or
more channels target the same genre then its audience is divided equally between
them.  Steiner finds that duplication tends to arise: a broadcaster will duplicate an
existing programme type, taking part of the audience from a competing channel,
rather than produce one that is as yet unserved whenever its share of the audience for
the former exceeds the total audience for the latter.
A simple example of channel diversity for a varying number of competing channels,
based on Steiner’s approach, is presented in Box 3.  With limited channel numbers
less popular genres tend to be left unserved while popular ones are duplicated.  The
precise extent of duplication depends on the distribution of viewer preferences, with a
greater disparity in audience size raising the extent of duplication.  As the number of
channels increases, genres with successively smaller audiences are served.  This
analysis suggests that with a small, fixed number of channels, competition performs
worse than multi-channel monopoly since business-stealing between broadcasters
results in duplication.
The Steiner model is special in a number of ways and its conclusions regarding the
impact of competition do not necessarily carry over to more general models.  Beebe
(1977) allows viewers to have a second choice programme that is preferred to not
watching at all, and shows that competition might produce more desirable outcomes
than suggested by Steiner.  Anderson and Coate (2005) explicitly model viewers’
disutility of advertising and allow free-to-air broadcasters to decrease the amount of
advertising shown in order to compete for viewers.  They show that with competition,
two free-to-air broadcasters would never duplicate a programme type since they
                                                
43 We ignore the choices of a licence fee funded broadcaster, both here and in Section 3.4.  Apart
from the (very weak) constraint of ensuring that viewers do not switch off entirely this mechanism
provides no specific incentives towards diversity or quality provision (although a licence fee
funded broadcaster which gains revenues from secondary rights, foreign sales and related
merchandise may thereby have greater incentives).  Incentives arise in relation to the continuation
of licence fee funding, where this may be made subject to certain programming commitments.
Popularity of programming may also play a role, but for political rather than economic reasons:
wide popular appeal might be necessary for the political acceptability of the licence fee.
44 Even if viewers were heterogeneous in their value to advertisers, e.g. due to their socio-economic
characteristics or having particular interests related to the advertiser’s product, these values would
need to be closely correlated with the individual’s own valuation of programming for advertising
funding to achieve the welfare-maximising outcome.
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would then compete fiercely by restricting advertising, which would eliminate
advertising revenues.  Relaxing the capacity constraint on the number of channels,
Spence and Owen (1977) find that, since a monopolist supplies fewer channels and
has the same biases, monopoly provision is worse than competition.
   Box 3: Programme diversity under advertising funding
There are three programme genres, A, B and C.  Viewers have exclusive preferences, each
consuming only one genre, while intensity of preference is uniform.  Total audiences for the
three genres number 100, 45 and 30 respectively.
Programme production incurs a fixed cost that is independent of the number of viewers and
the genre chosen.  Channels are purely advertising funded; advertising revenues are
proportional to audience size and independent of genre.
Competing single-channel broadcasters each choose a single genre.  If two or more
channels offer the same genre, the audience for that type is shared equally between them.
In non-cooperative equilibrium each broadcaster selects the genre that maximises its
audience given the choices of the others. 
Equilibrium choices for markets with different numbers of channels (between two and five)
are shown in the table below.  The first column gives the total number of channels, and the
body of the table shows the number of channels for each genre.
Duopoly duplicates a single, popular programme genre.  With three channels a second
genre is served, while five channels are required before all three tastes are met.  In the last
case viewer preferences are fulfilled but there is duplication of production costs.
Under multi-channel monopoly provision, by contrast, each channel serves a different genre
until the point where all three tastes are served (no more than three channels will be offered
as this would increase programme costs with no increase in revenue).  This outcome is the
same as the welfare optimum.
These models assume that programme genres have identical production costs.  In
reality this is not the case (see footnote 9), and relative profitability of genres depends
on profit margins, i.e. advertising revenues (which depend on audience, or ‘reach’)
minus production costs (which do not).  For example, drama series attract many
viewers but are costly to produce, and so have a low profit margin.45  Soaps also
attract a large audience but are cheaper to make, so have a high margin.  If a cheap
quiz show draws the same audience as an expensive period drama, an advertising-
funded broadcaster will not find it worthwhile to spend extra resources on the latter.
Thus, in the absence of regulation we would expect high margin programmes—soaps,
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entertainment, movies and national news—to be produced while low margin genres—
arts and religion, regional programming and current affairs—are largely ignored. 
Pay-TV
With viewers being charged directly, pay-TV is more responsive to their preferences
than advertising funded broadcasting.  Spence and Owen (1977) compare the two
systems in a model with heterogeneous intensity of preferences and unconstrained
channel numbers, considering both monopoly provision and competition.  They find
that, in both systems, programme types with low elasticity of demand (i.e. minority
tastes) are under-provided, as are more costly programmes (for a given contribution to
total surplus).  Pay-TV outperforms advertising funding regarding provision of
diversity, due to its ability to take account of intensity of preferences, although it
remains biased unless price discrimination between viewers is feasible.  With a tight
constraint on channel numbers, however, pay-TV may not be desirable since high
subscription prices reduce audience size compared with advertising funding.
3.4 Quality and innovation
What is meant by programme quality?
Before discussing quality provision under alternative funding systems it is important
to define what is meant by programme quality.  Economists regard product A as being
of higher quality than product B if all consumers value A more highly than B.  Thus,
when offered at the same price, all consumers choose A over B.  In other words
quality, or ‘vertical’ differentiation, refers to an agreed ranking over products.  By
contrast, diversity or ‘horizontal’ differentiation reflects differences in individual
rankings.  
In the broadcasting context quality needs to be distinguished from value judgements
between genres whereby certain programme types are regarded by some people as
being intrinsically more worthwhile or edifying than others—for example, the view
that that period dramas are ‘quality’ programmes while soaps are not.  Although it is
possible that all viewers have a higher willingness to pay for period dramas than for
soaps, audience behaviour when the two are placed head-to-head in free-to-air
schedules suggests that this is not the case.  Although there may be some agreed
rankings across genres, it is more straightforward to think of higher quality as
referring to improvements within a genre.  It is likely that all viewers would prefer,
for example, more spectacular special effects in a movie, better camera angles for a
football match, speedier news reporting, more illuminating discussion of current
affairs, and so on.46  In practice, measuring quality is far from straightforward,47 and
this has implications for the ability to regulate quality.
                                                
46 Ofcom (2004b, 2005) define high quality as ‘well funded and well produced’.  ‘Well produced’
would concur with the descriptions given here.  ‘Well funded’ reflects that raising quality tends to
increase production costs, thus higher quality programmes typically require greater funding.
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Quality provision
Higher programme quality typically requires greater production expenditure.  For the
broadcaster to have an incentive to provide higher quality, it must be able to extract a
sufficient proportion of the additional viewer surplus to cover the extra costs.  The
impact of funding mechanisms on quality provision is examined next; Appendix 1
contains a stylised duopoly model that illustrates some of the results.
With advertising funded television, profitability depends not on how strongly viewers
like a programme but only on how many of them watch it.  Although higher quality
programming draws in more viewers and hence increases advertising revenues, an
advertising funded broadcaster’s incentive to provide quality depends only on its
impact on viewer valuation at the margin, not its effect on infra-marginal viewers.  As
illustrated by the model in Appendix 1, with a fixed number of channels quality
provision is typically too low.48  It is possible that advertiser targeting of more
affluent viewers, or of those with a greater propensity to spend on advertised goods,
might result in some bias towards the viewing preferences of those groups.  However,
unless these viewers have a particularly strong desire for quality and, in addition, the
elasticity of their expenditure with respect to advertising is sufficiently high, this
effect is unlikely to guarantee the provision of high quality programmes.
In a pay-TV system part or all of the surplus from higher quality can be extracted
from infra-marginal viewers by raising viewer prices.  This generates incentives for
quality provision, and outcomes at or close to the social optimum can be achieved.  In
the duopoly model in Appendix 1, where all viewers have the same preference for
quality,49 a pay-TV operator provides the socially optimal level of quality given its
market share.  Quality is higher in pay-TV than under advertising funding.  Viewer
welfare may be higher or lower: in the pay-TV regime viewers pay more, but they
view higher quality programmes and fewer adverts.  If programme quality is difficult
to affect, viewer welfare is higher in a free-to-air regime than in pay-TV.
                                                                                                                                           
47 Ofcom (2004a, pp.34-36) examine programming expenditure by genre (in total and per hour), and
the change in these amounts over time, and also consider that the amount of original UK
production (as opposed to overseas acquisitions or repeats) is a useful indicator of quality.  None
of these is a robust measure of quality, however: expenditure may be higher, or may increase, for
several reasons without raising programme quality, and it is unclear why overseas output should be
regarded as being of low quality.
48 An interesting question concerns the relationship between programme quality and the amount of
advertising that commercial free-to-air broadcasters are permitted to show.  In many countries,
regulation constrains the amount of advertising airtime.  However, it is plausible that if
broadcasters were allowed to show more adverts, they may then choose to provide higher quality
programmes.  The reason for this is that having more adverts generates higher advertising revenues
per viewer, giving broadcasters an incentive to compete harder for viewers, which they do by
offering higher quality programmes.  Against this must be set the disutility of more frequent or
longer interruption by adverts, thus the net effect on viewer welfare is ambiguous.
49 Spence (1975) shows that when consumers differ in their preference for quality, a monopoly firm
might choose too high or too low a level of quality, as the ranking of marginal and average value
of quality is ambiguous.
20
As the number of channels increases, loss of market share per channel reduces quality
levels.  Hence, other things being equal, more fragmented audiences reduce quality
provision.  For this reason there is a trade-off between quality and diversity, both of
which are desirable to viewers.  The optimal number of channels balances the two
properties: if excess entry occurs quality is too low and diversity too high, while
insufficient entry limits diversity but provides higher quality.
In passing, the conceptual framework in Appendix 1 can be used to shed light on a
claim that is sometimes made about the benefits of a public broadcaster: that raising
the programme quality of one (regulated) broadcaster forces other (commercial)
broadcasters to follow suit.50  In this model, at least, the opposite result is found.  If
the quality of one broadcaster is increased then, all else equal, this decreases the
audience of rival broadcasters.  Since a pay-TV broadcaster’s return to investing in
quality is increasing in audience size, this implies that the commercial broadcaster
responds by reducing its programme quality.  The same point applies if the public
broadcaster offers its programmes for free: this decreases the market share that
commercial broadcasters can achieve and hence lowers the quality they provide.
Investment in innovation
Investment in innovation is closely related to quality provision.  Whereas quality
might often be thought of as deterministic, innovation involves stochastic
(unpredictable) improvements.  With the return to innovative programmes being
risky, the incentive to invest derives from the high returns accruing to successful
projects; and the return to success must be sufficiently high to offset the possibility of
failure.  Hence the ability to gain a high return from successful programmes is crucial
for innovation, in broadcasting as in any other sector.51 
Free-to-air broadcasters cannot directly capture additional viewer surplus generated
by a successful programme, and so the incentive to innovate is weak.  As noted above,
an advertising funded broadcaster’s incentive is determined by the impact on the
valuation of the marginal viewer rather than viewer surplus as a whole; for this reason
innovation, like quality, will be underprovided.  Pay-TV, by contrast, stimulates
innovation by providing a mechanism through which (high) viewer surplus generated
by successful innovation can be captured by broadcasters.
4. Should people be allowed to watch only what they want?
Public policy towards broadcasting encompasses concerns that go beyond simply
meeting viewer demands as currently expressed.  The view has long existed that,
                                                
50 For example, while discussing ‘competition for quality’ Ofcom (2004a) states, ‘[t]he BBC kept
ITV honest; ITV kept the BBC on its toes.’
51 This principle applies to many creative activities.  Successful innovators, such as pop stars and
best-selling authors, generate very high returns.  Commercial backers are willing to take the risk of
promoting new artists, and to underwrite the costs involved, because they share in the revenues
gained by the successful ones.
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rather than simply ‘giving the public want they want’, broadcasters should provide the
programmes that they ought to watch (for some reason), and withhold or restrict the
material that they ought not to watch.
These concerns were stated explicitly in the early days of (radio) broadcasting in the
UK, when the idea that a public broadcaster should control what people received was
more widely accepted than is it today.  John Reith, the first Director General of the
BBC, wrote,52 ‘the preservation of a high moral tone is obviously of paramount
importance’; although he conceded that ‘[t]here is no harm in trivial things; in
themselves they may even be unquestionably beneficial, for they may assist the more
serious work by providing the measure of salt which seasons.’  Ronald Coase
remarked that public service broadcasting matched the preferences of some listeners
more than others: ‘[t]hough the programme policy of the [BBC] gave the lower social
classes what they ought to have, it gave the educated classes what they wanted’.53
Moreover, at this time competition in broadcasting was seen as potentially dangerous
since it might undermine the ability of the BBC, through its programme monopoly, to
control what was received.54
There exist a number of possible reasons for the view that, in the broadcasting sector,
merely meeting viewers’ current demands is not sufficient to maximise social welfare.
The arguments can be divided into two broad rationales:
• viewers do not necessarily choose what it is in their own best interests to
watch; and
• television viewing has effects on the wider population, that are not taken into
account by the viewer themselves.
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively we examine the possible arguments in each case.
4.1 Do viewers make the ‘right’ decisions for themselves?
Textbook economics assumes that the consumer is able to assess the contribution of
each of the available goods to her utility and make the choice that maximises her own
welfare.  However, this ability may sometimes be less than perfect.  There are three
                                                
52 These quotes are from 1924 and 1925.  See Coase (1950), page 47. 
53 Coase (1950), page 177.
54 The BBC used this argument to protect its position when it was threatened with competition from
wire broadcasting (a relay exchange system) in the 1930s, stating, ‘[t]he system … contains within
it forces which uncontrolled might be disruptive of the spirit and intention of the BBC charter’; see
Coase (1948).  The BBC view gained support from elsewhere: a Times leader article published
from around that time, quoted in Coase (1950), argued, ‘[w]hat is certain about the relay system is
that, under present conditions, it will spread both widely and rapidly among the poorer classes of
the population; and this country will not for long be able to congratulate itself on a broadcasting
system under which, while broadcasting is controlled with enlightenment and impartiality by a
responsible public corporation, the listening is controlled by Tom, Dick and Harry.’
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reasons why the consumer’s choice may sometime fail to achieve the best outcome
for herself:
• experience goods: the consumer’s utility function is fixed, and represents what
is in her own best interests, but she cannot determine all of the relevant
characteristics of the good prior to consumption.  The consumption experience
reveals these characteristics, allowing subsequent decisions to be based on
better information;
• merit goods: characteristics of the good are known in advance of consumption,
but the consumer’s utility function is not fixed.  When a previously untried
good is consumed, preferences change such that greater utility is derived from
its future consumption; and
• paternalism: the consumer’s utility function may not represent what is in her
best interests, thus utility-maximising choices do not necessarily maximise her
welfare.
We start by discussing the arguments surrounding experience and merit goods, then
turn to possible justifications for paternalism.
Experience and merit goods
It is likely that there are elements of both experience and merit goods in television
programming.  The attractions of a new series are not entirely apparent prior to
viewing—whether a new comedy will be amusing, for example—and certain tastes
develop only with experience.  However, these features are true of many other goods,
including restaurant meals, music albums and leisure activities.  It is unclear why they
are deemed (by some) to be so problematic as to justify intervention in broadcasting,
but not in other sectors.
Moreover, although more complex than the standard case of a fully informed
consumer exercising a static utility-maximising choice, rational decisions regarding
both experience and merit goods can be taken by consumers.  A hypothetical rational
consumer anticipates that trying a new product might cause her assessment of its
value to go up, either because her knowledge of its characteristics improves
(experience goods) or because her own tastes are developed by the experience (merit
goods).  Taking potential future benefits into account, she will consume the good.  In
addition, consumers frequently learn about product characteristics and the possibility
of developing new tastes from the experiences of others: this diffusion process works
well for restaurants, holidays and sporting activities, and surely also for television
programmes.
It might be argued that the consumer could be short sighted and ignore, or fail to
realise, the fact that his tastes or knowledge may change as a result of actions within
his own control.  For anyone with a reasonable level of experience, however, this
would imply that he disregards, or perhaps forgets, similar experiences of learning
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and development in the past; the former would be irrational, while the latter seems
implausible.  Of course, trying out a new product involves some risk: consumption
might turn out not to be desirable after all.  But this needs to be balanced against the
possibility of higher utility in the future.  In this sense sampling is similar to other
forms of investment: the consumer incurs a cost now (by consuming a product that
does not maximise immediate utility) for the prospect of an attractive return in the
future (consumption of the product when it yields high utility).  Consumers are
capable of undertaking such decisions in other dynamic contexts; and moreover, the
impact of a poor viewing selection would seem to be rather less severe than a bad
choice of mortgage or pension, for example.
Commercial suppliers have an incentive to facilitate learning and the development of
new tastes, e.g. through promotions and introductory offers, since they benefit from
higher future consumption.  To encourage sampling a broadcasters adopt a number of
strategies: launch a series on a free-to-air channel then move it to pay-TV; show short
excerpts of a programme as a trailer; or (with pay-per-view) levy the charge after a
portion of the programme has elapsed.55  The broadcaster could also build a reputation
for high quality programming, increasing viewers’ confidence in them and making
them more likely to purchase its programmes in the future.
Even if there were a case that experience and merit goods are particularly prevalent in
broadcasting, and that these problems cannot be overcome as described above, the
idea that a broadcaster can make optimal decisions for them is implausible.56  Viewers
are heterogeneous, and both the actual preferences and potential tastes of a large
number of individuals would need to be assessed.  Note that, in the case of merit
goods, since what is at issue are tastes that are not yet developed, viewer surveys will
be uninformative.  Nevertheless, merit good arguments are often put forward as a
justification for directing public broadcasters to provide ‘challenging’ programmes
and to stimulate rather than follow viewer tastes.57 
Paternalism
The paternalistic view is that (some) people are unable to take decisions that are in
their own best interests and that, left to their own devices, they will fail to achieve the
optimal outcome for themselves.  In economic terms this implies either that the
consumer is for some reason unable to take actions that maximise his utility, or that
                                                
55 Note that the last two mechanisms can be used for a single programme that is not part of a series,
as for movies.
56 Coase (1966) expresses scepticism about the ability of a public broadcasting authority to determine
which programmes should be broadcast in the best interests of viewers.  Referring to the UK’s
1962 Pilkington Report on Broadcasting, he states, ‘[t]he committee avoids the question of how it
should be decided which programs to transmit and for the phrase “what the public wants,” they
substitute another and better, “what the public authority wants.”  What the public authority should
want, how it would get the information which would enable it to do what it should, and how in
practice it would be likely to act are questions which all disappear in a cloud of pious platitudes.’
57 See Coase (1966) for quotes from early public reports and Ofcom (2005) for a recent example.
24
his utility function, both now and in the future, does not represent his true welfare.
Even if this were the case, for intervention to make sense it must also be believed that
the public authority (here, a public broadcaster or regulator) is able to make better
decisions and get closer to achieving consumer welfare.
As illustrated by the quotes above, Reithian broadcasting was based on a heavy dose
of paternalism with the public broadcaster providing programmes that people ought to
watch, rather than simply those they wanted to watch.  Today, the idea that a public
broadcaster or government agency knows better than viewers themselves what is good
for them, and should exert control over what they watch, gains less acceptance.
Moreover, a centrally-controlled broadcasting system is open to the risk of bias
towards material that the government wants people to see, rather than that which it is
in their best interests to watch.
Nonetheless, paternalism remains evident in controls on the broadcasting of harmful
and offensive material, such as violent or sexually explicit scenes, even now that
encryption can be used to prevent unintentional viewing of such material and thus
restrict it to those who have chosen to watch.58  A significant degree of paternalism
quite naturally exists in relation to children’s viewing.  Many parents express concern
about the programming that their children are exposed to, as well the total time spent
viewing, and wish to exert some control over this.  Wider public concerns have also
been raised (e.g. by the UK government and various agencies) over areas such as food
advertising to children.  This debate presumes that children (in particular) are not
capable of making wise choices about what is good for them, and that there is a
public, as well as parental, obligation to protect them.
4.2 Wider impacts of television viewing
A number of arguments for intervention in broadcasting arise from externalities
associated with television viewing.  That is to say, if large numbers of people view
certain kinds of programmes, this affects the wider population in some way that the
viewers themselves do not take into account.  An externality may be either positive,
generating external benefits, or negative, causing detriment elsewhere.  In the
presence of positive externalities the market level of consumption is too low from the
social perspective; with negative externalities consumption is too high.  In either case
measures which induce something closer to the socially optimal outcome are justified,
as long as this benefit outweighs the cost of intervention.
In this section we examine various external effects of television viewing that have
been cited by commentators, starting with positive externalities before then turning to
negative ones.
                                                
58 See Camerer et al. (2003) for an economic argument in favour of certain forms of paternalism.
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Positive externalities
A number of positive externalities have been claimed for television broadcasting:
• educational benefits; 
• network externalities (the ‘water cooler’ effect); and
• social or ‘citizenship’ benefits.
That there may be educational effects of television viewing, and external benefits
generated by education, is uncontroversial.  As well as providing directly educational
material (such as schools programming), television can be a powerful medium for
providing information about, and stimulating interest in, a variety of topics—ranging
from science and technology to history and languages—that can be broadly defined as
educational.  As with formal types of education this benefits the economy through the
creation of a more educated and productive workforce.  There may also be direct
benefits to particular individuals; for example, if information gathered from watching
a medical drama is used to administer life-saving first aid.  Since these benefits are
quite diffused, they are unlikely to be internalised by market participants and there is
a serious prospect that educational programming will be underprovided.
The role of television viewing as a common experience that people discuss ‘around
the water cooler’ might be regarded as a form of network externality.  To the extent
that these discussions raise enjoyment of viewing commonly watched programmes,
there may be a positive externality between the viewing behaviour of different
individuals.  But the creation of widely known brands through ‘water cooler’
discussions is commonplace for market-driven products such as pop music, sports
teams, novels and Hollywood movies; it is unclear why the existence of such an effect
justifies intervention in broadcasting.  Mechanisms exist to internalise such
externalities: viewers themselves may coordinate their viewing as benefits flow in
both directions; meanwhile broadcasters, as beneficiaries of greater uptake, have an
incentive to create popular and distinctive programmes that stimulate discussion.
Although difficult to quantify, it is unlikely that (uninternalised) effects of this kind
are of great importance.
The ‘water cooler’ effect has also been mentioned as a forum for shared experiences
that in turn generate other social benefits.  In this view it is not the effect itself but
rather its wider behavioural implications that are an externality.  For example,
Brookes (2004) highlights the role of television in building ‘social capital’ by
improving understanding and building trust between people through shared
experiences.  However, as noted above, there is little reason to suppose that the
mechanism itself will break down under market provision of television.  Moreover,
there is some irony in highlighting as a mechanism for promoting social cohesion a
medium that is also much criticised for contributing to greater isolation and reducing
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participation in community activities.59  (Negative effects of television viewing are
examined further below.)
There is also the currently popular notion that television is an important medium for
building ‘citizenship’.  The most obvious aspect of this is that accurate reporting of
news and current affairs can help create a well-informed citizenry who can adequately
discipline government and other powerful interests, to the benefit of all.  The role of
the media, especially television, in the political process is the focus of current
research.60  However, empirical evidence concerning the impact of television on
political involvement is mixed.  Prat and Strömberg (2004) find that the introduction
of commercial television in Sweden in 1990 raised voter turnout.  Gentzkow (2004),
however, finds the growth of television to have had a negative impact on voter turnout
in the US, perhaps by inducing substitution away from other media (such as
newspapers) which carry more political coverage.
Moving beyond political involvement, it is sometimes argued that people become
more community-oriented, or more tolerant, as a result of watching certain behaviour
on television.  However, a direct link between the messages and representations in
television programmes and viewers’ own behaviour is highly contentious, with little
clear evidence.  Moreover, even if such a link exists, this must be placed alongside the
isolating effect of television noted above.  All in all, it is highly unclear that television
should be promoted as a means of inducing people to be more community-spirited.
Negative externalities
There are a number of negative externalities associated with television viewing.
Quite apart from the possibility of undesirable behavioural responses to particular
broadcast content—just as for positive attributes, the link between violence portrayed
on television and violent behaviour is controversial—there are a number of reasons to
discourage heavy television viewing.
It is sometimes argued that many people spend too much time watching television,
from both an individual and a social perspective.  On average, each individual in the
industrialised world watches television for about 3 hours every day.  Among concerns
regarding the sedentary nature of modern life, television viewing is a significant
contributing factor.  Children’s viewing habits in particular are a cause for concern:
watching television has been found to lower a child’s metabolic rate, reduce physical
                                                
59 Putnam (2000, page 217) provides an apt quote from T.S. Eliot, who in 1963 wrote that television
‘is a medium of entertainment which permits millions of people to listen to the same joke at the
same time, and yet remain lonesome.’  
60 In these models, media affect political outcomes through a variety of routes: by building (or
destroying) a politician’s reputation; through monitoring of politicians’ actions; and by enhancing
the salience of particular issues at the ballot box.  For example, based on the premise that
politicians deliver policies that favour informed voters, Strömberg (2004a, 2004b) examines the
media’s role in this process as the provider of information.  Besley and Prat (2004) examine the
role of press freedom; in this analysis, features of the media industry determine the government’s
ability to capture the media and to control political outcomes.
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exercise and invite over-eating (especially when combined with tempting adverts for
junk food).  Spitzer (2005) argues that television impairs a child’s ability to learn and
to concentrate.  He also estimates that viewing habits and resulting obesity lead to the
premature death of around twenty thousand Germans each year.
Putnam (2000) summarises various studies about viewing habits, and factors that are
correlated with them.  For instance, he documents a strong correlation between heavy
viewing and various indicators of anti-social behaviour (such as the number of letters
written to friends, ‘giving the finger’ to another driver, etc.).  Although one would
rightly hesitate before inferring any direction of causality—socially isolated
individuals might turn to television to fill their time—Putnam also reports the findings
of a number of ‘natural experiments’ where local communities were suddenly able to
receive television signals.  Field observations indicated a causal link between the
introduction of television and the subsequent reduction in community activities.
In its early years, it was hoped that (radio) broadcasting might enliven national life by
stimulating other activities.  William Haley, then Director General of the BBC, wrote
in 1947 that,61 
‘[The public service broadcaster] does not want people to be listening all the
time … For broadcasting will not be a social asset if it produces a nation of
listeners.  … If it cannot give to literature more readers than it withholds, it
will have failed in what should be its true purpose.  Its aim must be to make
people active, not passive, both in the fields of recreation and public affairs.’
Viewed from today, this ambition would appear to have been over-optimistic.
Intervention to mitigate externalities
While there may be disagreements about the source and scale of externalities, there is
a coherent rationale for intervention in the broadcasting market to promote those
programmes generating positive externalities and to diminish those with negative
externalities.
To diminish the negative aspects, broadcasting standards could be imposed to restrict
the broadcasting of harmful or inappropriate programming.62  In relation to children,
measures might be adopted to facilitate parents’ efforts to control their children’s
viewing, such as clear programme labelling and time-of-day controls (e.g. the UK’s
‘nine o’clock watershed’, before which the broadcasting of programmes unsuitable
for children is not permitted).
Regarding positive externalities, intervention may be desirable to increase the
provision of socially beneficial programming.  For example, subsidies for educational
                                                
61 See Coase (1950), pages 175-176.
62 Note that, to be effective, these measures must apply to all broadcasts, not just public service
channels.  In a multimedia world it might seem desirable to extend similar standards to other
media, such as the Internet, but such controls would be wide-ranging and difficult to enforce.
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material may be justified.  Provision may be increased by means of obligations
imposed on designated public service broadcasters, or by giving inducements to all
broadcasters to show such programmes.  However, in order to generate their desired
effects it is crucial that these programmes are actually watched, not just that they are
broadcast.  We turn to this issue next.
4.3 Will people watch what we want them to watch?
In principle, consumption of a product can be increased by reducing its price.  In
broadcasting, however, individual programmes are typically viewed as part of a
channel and once a subscription has been taken out, or in any case if it is broadcast
free-to-air, the incremental price for watching any programme is zero.  With many
attractive programmes available for free at the margin, a negative price (i.e. a payment
to the viewer) might well be required to increase consumption of socially beneficial
content to the optimal level, especially if does not directly appeal to the viewer’s own
tastes.  It is difficult, however, to come up with an effective system to make payments
for watching.63  The price mechanism therefore seems inadequate as a means of
inducing people to watch ‘what we want them to watch’.
Broadcasters have strategies which exploit viewer behaviour to increase the audience
for less popular programmes.  If viewers tend to remain tuned to the same channel at
the end of a programme, it may be possible to retain their attention for less gripping
material by scheduling this between more popular shows (known within the industry
as ‘hammocking’).  However, as viewers increasingly switch around between an ever-
expanding range of channels, the less effective this strategy becomes.64
Ultimately, a more effective approach might be to include PSB messages within
popular programmes, analogously to the ‘product placement’ strategy of advertisers.
This might include, for example, first aid techniques demonstrated during medical
dramas, or instances of racial tolerance occurring within the story lines of popular
soaps.  The view that by tackling difficult social issues in a responsible manner, soaps
such as EastEnders are ‘providing an important public service’ might be interpreted
as advocating something similar to this.65  An historical instance of the strategy of
conveying public information messages through popular entertainment is the long-
running Radio 4 drama series, The Archers, originally conceived as a way of keeping
farmers informed on best practice.66  As a means of catching viewers’ attention in a
                                                
63 In particular, whether someone has watched, and done so attentively, is unverifiable.
64 Ofcom (2004a) reports that even in analogue terrestrial homes, viewers typically watch at least
three of the five channels over the course of an evening. (Supporting documents, Vol. 1 Part 4).  
65 From an interview with Tessa Jowell, the UK Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport.  See
The Independent, ‘Watching with Tessa’, 2 March 2004.
66 When The Archers was first broadcast in 1950 it was hoped that, although farmers would listen for
the stories, they would along the way pick up messages to help them increase production at a time
when Britain was still subject to food rationing.  In fact its educational purpose far outlived
rationing, continuing until 1972.
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multi-channel environment this strategy could become the most, even the only,
effective technique, although care must be taken not to undermine the popularity of a
show by overloading it with ‘worthy’ messages and losing its original appeal.
5. Provision of public service broadcasting
Supposing that some form of intervention in broadcasting content is desirable, say to
increase the provision of programmes generating educational benefits, how is this to
be achieved?  The term ‘public service broadcasting’ encompasses a range of systems
and institutions.  This section describes and assesses the main options available to
policymakers.
To be effective, public service broadcasting needs to achieve two purposes.  First, the
relevant types of programmes (say, those with educational content) need to be
produced and made available to viewers through broadcasting.  Secondly, as
explained in Section 4.3, people must be induced to watch them.  Since the aim is to
satisfy social purposes beyond the viewer’s own preferences, it cannot simply be
presumed that uptake will be sufficiently high to achieve the social optimum.
Two broadly-defined systems for providing PSB may be distinguished; in each case
the broadcasters may be commercial companies or public bodies (or a combination of
the two):
• Licensing: public service broadcasters are obliged to meet certain programme
requirements as conditions of their licence to operate; or
• Commissioning: public service programmes are commissioned from producers
and broadcasters using contestable funding.67
We examine the two types of system in turn.
Licensing of public service broadcasters
Under a licensing system, public service obligations are imposed on broadcasters as
conditions of their licence.  An easily specified and limited obligation would be to
require a certain amount of airtime to be devoted to news coverage during peak hours.
A more wide-ranging intervention might be to require certain minimum amounts of
specified types of programming (e.g. of different genres, or with certain educational
content).  Quality requirements might be stated, although what is meant by quality is
subjective and difficult to specify making this intrinsically harder to regulate.  A
similar problem applies to innovation.
Programme obligations (beyond what the commercial market would anyway provide)
are costly to broadcasters, either directly (by increasing production costs) or as an
opportunity cost (by requiring less popular, and hence less profitable, programmes to
be shown).  Their sustainability depends on two factors: the method of revenue
                                                
67 Programme commissioning is used in New Zealand and Singapore.
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generation used and whether or not the number of channels is constrained.  If licence
fee funding is used then, in principle at least, its level can be set to match the cost of
the obligations.  With advertising funding or pay-TV, obligations are sustainable as
long as broadcasters can generate sufficient revenues to cover the costs incurred. 
While the number of channels is tightly constrained due to spectrum scarcity, the high
rents that accrue to commercial broadcasters68 can be used as an implicit form of
funding, cross-subsidising public service obligations.  Without spectrum constraints,
competition between channels eliminates scarcity rents.  Public service obligations
must then either be reduced so as not to undermine these broadcasters’ viability, or
imposed on all broadcasters so that even with entry (which will then be more limited)
costs can still be covered.  Alternatively, direct funding of public service obligations,
from a licence fee or general taxation, could be used.
A regulator must specify licence obligations, monitor compliance and determine the
renewal or reallocation of licences.  The burden of regulation increases with the
complexity of licence terms and the number of licensees.  If licences are granted for a
lengthy period (e.g. for several years at a time) the incentive for compliance is weak:
the ultimate penalty for failure to meet programming obligations is licence
withdrawal, but this is a distant (and sometimes implausible) threat.
Commissioning of public service programmes
In a commissioning system, funds from a licence fee or taxation are used to finance
programme commissions.  In principle, programmes may be sourced from any
producer (including independent production units) and broadcast on any channel,
either purchasing the programme and the broadcasting slot separately or procuring
them together from a vertically integrated broadcaster.  Competitive tendering
mechanisms provide incentives for efficient production and minimise acquisition
costs: competitive bidding will drive subsidies down to the difference between
production cost and revenues gained from elsewhere (e.g. from advertisers), not the
full programme cost.  Moreover, with frequent commissions repeated interactions
stimulate producers to build and sustain a reputation for delivering high quality.  
Although the focus of recent attention,69 the idea that broadcasters might compete for
public funds is not a new one.  In 1936 the Economist, quoted in Coase (1950), asked:
‘is it really necessary to choose [between the American and British systems]?  Could
not the merits of both systems be combined?  ...  Let the State continue to collect the
licence, let it, if you will, own the actual transmitting stations.  But let the
                                                
68 Indeed, the phrase ‘a licence to print money’ was coined when the licences for ITV, the first
commercial television channel in the UK, were awarded in 1955.  Funding from spectrum rents
has been a major building block of PSB in the UK over the past 50 years; see Section 8.
69 A competitive commissioning system has been advocated in the UK by Elstein (2004) and
Peacock (2004).  In January 2005 the government-appointed Burns panel recommended the
creation of an independent Public Service Broadcasting Commission (PSBC) with, among other
powers, the ability to award some licence fee funds to broadcasters other than the BBC.  The
government did not follow this recommendation in its subsequent Green Paper, DCMS (2005).
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programmes be provided by two corporations, say the ABC and the BBC, competing
with each other.  They should share the licence revenue and the listener might even be
permitted to distribute some very small fraction of his ten shillings as a mark of
favour the corporation which he considers the better.’
A commissioning body or ‘Arts Council of the Air’ would be needed, to call for
tenders or specify areas within which programmes are invited, assess competing bids
and award contracts.  Multiple commissioning bodies might be used:70 this could
introduce competition (or at least benchmarking) into the commissioning activity
itself, and help prevent good projects from falling through the net.  Alternatively there
could be specialisation in the commissioning process, with separate bodies for music,
the sciences, and so on.  Moreover, a system with multiple commissioning bodies
would be less susceptible to capture by a particular broadcaster or interest group.
In either a licensing or commissioning system, requirements must be determined with
a view to the ability to attract viewers, both when devising commissions or licence
obligations, and in selecting broadcasters.  Innovative formats and non-traditional
broadcasters may be effective in reaching new audiences, especially those that are
traditionally harder to reach.71
6. Public service broadcasting in the analogue era
We now draw on the analysis set out above to examine the rationale for, and provision
of, public service broadcasting.  First, in this section, we consider the traditional
analogue environment; then, in Section 7, we turn to the digital world.  Technological
developments are a crucial part of this, so each section starts by briefly describing the
relevant features.  We examine the applicability of market failure and ‘citizenship’
arguments for intervention given those characteristics, drawing out implications for
the nature and scope of PSB.  Finally, we consider the means by which public service
broadcasting might be provided in each setting, and its relative effectiveness.
Analogue terrestrial broadcasting is characterised by two key features:
• spectrum constraints limit the number of channels, and broadcasters earn
scarcity rents since returns cannot be driven down by free entry; and
• non-excludability of viewing requires programmes to be broadcast free-to-air,
eliminating subscription as a means of generating revenue.72
                                                
70 Funding of medical research would be a good analogy for this, with (in the UK) the Medical
Research Council, Wellcome Trust, European Union and numerous charities each offering funds.
71 Prat and Strömberg (2004) found that commercial television was more effective than the public
broadcaster in raising viewers’ knowledge of political matters and raising voter turnout, especially
among (harder-to-reach) younger and less-informed viewers.
72 Cable connection can be denied to non-payers, and satellite services can use encryption for
analogue as well as digital services.  These platforms are excluded from our analysis as they have
only recently been developed in the UK.
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Since commercial broadcasters are unlikely to have access to licence fee funding,73 in
practice the second feature implies that advertising is their sole source of funds.  Thus,
under analogue broadcasting a market system would consist of just a small number of
advertising-funded broadcasters.  Drawing on the analysis in Section 3 it can be seen
that the outcome of such a market would fail to meet the demands of television
viewers in a number of respects; clearly, a ‘market failure’ rationale for PSB exists in
analogue broadcasting:
• diversity of programming is insufficient, with broadcasters duplicating popular
genres rather than serving niche tastes;
• quality of programming is too low; 
• innovation incentives are poor; and
• airtime devoted to advertising tends to be excessive, especially if its nuisance
cost to viewers is high.
Added to this, there are wider concerns beyond the viewer’s own preferences that may
justify some form of intervention.  Although arguments that viewers fail to make the
best choices for themselves do not seem sufficiently strong to merit intervention in the
generality of cases, a more paternalistic approach towards children may be justified.
With all channels broadcast free-to-air, it may be necessary to prohibit certain types of
unpleasant material to prevent unintentional viewing.  While disagreements exist over
the precise sources and magnitude of externalities, wider social and educational
effects of television provide a coherent rationale for intervention to increase provision
of programmes generating positive externalities and diminish those with negative
externalities.
To summarise, in the analogue context an appropriate system of PSB would be
designed to:
• provide programmes catering for niche interests which would otherwise be left
unserved;
• stimulate higher quality and innovation in programming;
• limit the amount of airtime given over to advertising (if this can be done
without further weakening broadcasters’ incentives for quality provision);
• restrict the broadcasting of harmful material, and protect children; and
• promote the provision and viewing of socially beneficial programmes, such as
those containing educational material.
Most of these purposes can be seen in existing systems of public service broadcasting,
including the UK’s.  A case study of this system is given in Section 8.
                                                
73 A group of equipment manufacturers could perhaps add a surcharge to sales of television sets to
fund broadcasting services, as was initially the case for radio in the UK, but competition between
suppliers would undermine this.  In practice government support is necessary for enforcement of a
licence fee.
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Turning to provision, rents resulting from spectrum constraints can be used as an
implicit source of funding for costly public service obligations (via a licensing
system), reducing the need for direct government subsidy or a (higher) licence fee.  A
further implication of spectrum constraints is that the viewer faces a limited choice of
channels.  If public service broadcasters account for a high proportion (perhaps even
all) of these channels, they can largely determine what people watch.  Historically, in
the face of limited competition, socially desirable but less popular programmes have
nonetheless been able to gain a reasonable audience.
7. Public service broadcasting in the digital world
The adoption of digital technology, with related developments, fundamentally alters
the characteristics of television broadcasting.  Specifically the following technological
changes, often referred to under the umbrella term of ‘digitisation’, are taking place:
• digital compression techniques allow many more channels to be broadcast for
a given spectrum allocation, greatly relaxing the constraint on the number of
channels;74
• conditional access systems facilitate the exclusion of unauthorised viewing,75
making subscription funding feasible; and
• personal video recorders (PVRs) give the viewer far greater control over the
timing and content of television viewing.
Moving to pay-TV, especially when combined with a huge expansion in the number
of channels, greatly mitigates the market failures arising under advertising-funded
broadcasting.  Since viewer surplus can be extracted, commercial broadcasters have
an incentive to deliver a diverse range of programmes, with quality appropriate to
viewers’ willingness-to-pay.76  Fewer adverts are shown in pay-TV;77 moreover, if the
use of PVRs becomes widespread this will undermine advertising as a source of
funding and further reduce the number of adverts shown, perhaps to a level that is too
low from a social (and viewers’) perspective, as shown in Appendix 1.  Viewer
                                                
74 Depending on spectrum allocation, digital terrestrial transmission (DTT) allows several dozen
channels to be broadcast, while digital satellite and cable platforms can support a few hundred.
Although demand growth might eventually alter this conclusion if technological improvements do
not keep pace, spectrum availability is no longer a binding constraint on channel numbers.
75 Although pay-TV piracy through copying of smart cards may sometimes be a problem, this can be
overcome by periodically issuing new smart cards to subscribers, and improving encryption
software.
76 A sceptic might argue that the current state of pay-TV in the UK is evidence against this claim.
However, caution should be exercised in forming judgements about the output of a fully
commercial broadcasting market based on the existing pay-TV sector, as the presence of a state-
funded, sometimes high-quality broadcaster—namely, the BBC—greatly diminishes a commercial
broadcaster’s incentive to supply high-quality programming.
77 Interestingly, digital television is witnessing the emergence of shopping channels such as QVC
whose primary purpose is advertising and that are watched for this reason.  Like advertising-only
newspapers, the use of such formats may increase as these become a more effective means of
reaching potential viewers than traditional advertising methods.
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charging can be implemented in ways that minimise exclusion of desired viewing,
using pricing techniques such as bundling and windowing.
The move to pay-TV might raise certain access issues.  Charging may mean that some
viewers watch a more limited number of channels than if all were broadcast free-to-
air.  Although this is largely a matter of individual choice, and some of the
programming would not have been produced anyway without the ability to charge
viewers, distributional concerns might be raised.  For example, with its ability to
capture viewer surplus, pay-TV can outbid free-to-air broadcasters for popular sports
rights (although this may be mitigated by other benefits to football clubs from
retaining some amount of free-to-air coverage).  For this reason, in the UK certain
sports events deemed to be of national importance are ‘listed’ to restrict the
acquisition of exclusive pay-TV rights and ensure wide public access to them.78
In the digital world, viewer sovereignty in the marketplace largely removes the
‘market failure’ basis for PSB, as the unregulated market will give people broadly
what they want to watch.  This does not necessarily imply that there is no basis for
intervention, however.  We saw in Section 6, for the case of analogue broadcasting,
that there are arguments for controls on the broadcasting of certain types of harmful
material, and increasing the provision of programmes which generate wider social
benefits.  These arguments do not disappear with digitisation, although some changes
might be possible.
Enhanced viewer control, resulting from encryption and PVR use, allow individuals
to avoid seeing unwanted material.  These technologies can also assist parents in
controlling what is seen by children.  If these protections are deemed adequate it
might be possible to relax existing prohibitions on the broadcasting of certain
material, as long as this is shown only on encrypted channels (perhaps with PIN
protection) and clearly labelled as to its nature.79  Where significant negative
externalities arise, however, an outright ban would probably still be justified.
There is little reason to suppose that the magnitude of positive externalities alters
significantly with digitisation.  It is possible that market provision of some types of
socially beneficial programmes will increase, to the extent that these are favoured by
minority tastes that will now be served.  Even so, market under-provision of socially
beneficial programmes remains very likely and some form of intervention to increase
its supply may be desirable. 
However, following digitisation the question of whether people will actually watch
socially beneficial programmes becomes a critical one.  In its early, monopoly days
the BBC could effectively force viewers to watch the programmes it thought they
should, since the only alternative was to switch off.  The introduction of competition
                                                
78 See Hansen and Kyhl (2001) for an analysis of the effects of this system.
79 Although in its 2005 Broadcasting Code, Ofcom decided that such measures would be inadequate
to protect children and maintained the prohibition on R18-rated (i.e. pornographic) material.
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from commercial television reduced the BBC’s control, but while the number of
channels remained limited the audience for public service material held up fairly well. 
In the digital world the availability of a huge range of competing channels with
electronic programme guides (EPGs) to assist selection, together with the introduction
of PVRs, increases enormously the ease with which the viewer can switch channel, or
skip some part of it, as soon as less appealing content comes on.  When presented
with so much attractive material viewers may exercise this choice by choosing
entertainment over more challenging and educational material.80  In this environment
socially beneficial programmes may struggle to gain attention: even if we think it is
desirable that people should watch more, or higher quality, news than they would do
if left to themselves, there may be little that can be done about this.  As Richard Eyre,
then Chief Executive of ITV, succinctly put it:81
‘Free school milk doesn’t work when the kids go and buy Coca-Cola because
it’s available and they prefer it and they can afford it.  So public service
broadcasting will soon be dead.’
Unlike the Reithian era, the idea that competition should be held back—if this were
even possible—so that viewing can be directed towards public service programming
would not gain acceptance today.  With no realistic scope for reducing commercial
competition, alternative means of promoting the uptake of public service content must
be found if the system is to be continued.  As described in Section 4.3, this might
utilise methods akin to ‘product placement’; but there are limits to how far this can be
taken without undermining a programme’s appeal.  Whatever their desirability, if
positive externalities cannot, in fact, be realised then these constitute a weak basis for
public intervention.  With the ‘market failure’ rationale largely removed and growing
difficulties in getting people to watch ‘what we want them to watch’, the likely
outcome is that (aside from controls on harmful material) public service broadcasting
will indeed soon be dead.
Provision of public service broadcasting in the digital world
On the assumption that some level of intervention to increase the provision of certain
types of programming is nonetheless desired, we next examine the implications of
digitisation for the funding and delivery of PSB.
                                                
80 Ofcom (2004a) reports that more serious and challenging programmes are most affected by multi-
channel competition, with their share of viewing more than 50% lower in multi-channel homes
compared with those having analogue terrestrial channels only (see Ofcom 2004, Figure 28).
However, being a contemporaneous comparison between self-selected groups these data suffer
from selection bias and are likely to overstate the magnitude of any change in behaviour by
individual households when faced with a greater choice of channels.  The fact that as multi-
channel TV has grown (entertainment-focused) BBC1 and ITV1 have experienced large falls in
viewing share while (more factual and culture-based) BBC2 and Channel 4 have held up relatively
well, indicates a significant selection effect.  See Ofcom (2004a), Figure 22; BARB data for a
longer period show trends stretching back to the launch of pay-TV in 1991.
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Following digitisation and the relaxation of spectrum constraints, channel entry
intensifies competition and eliminates the scarcity rents of incumbents.  Whatever the
source of revenue, commercial broadcasters’ profits fall as audiences fragment.82
Advertising revenue is additionally threatened by the use of PVRs to avoid adverts.
Unless spectrum availability is artificially constrained, gifted spectrum can no longer
confer sufficient value to fund expensive programming requirements.  Onerous PSB
obligations imposed on commercial broadcasters become unsustainable, threatening
the survival of a broad system of provision that includes commercial as well as public
broadcasters.  If commercial broadcasters are to participate direct subsidies will be
required, and these must be funded out of general taxation or by ‘top-slicing’ the
licence fee revenues currently granted to public broadcasters.
The licence fee, unlike advertising revenue, is immune to commercial pressure.
However, as a compulsory charge on all TV viewers, it is subject to constraint of
popular acceptability.  This is likely to be threatened in the digital world, for two main
reasons.  First, the growing use of broadband, and even mobile phones, for video
streaming blurs the distinction between the television set and other devices, rendering
a licence fee that applies to one but not the rest increasingly arbitrary.  Extending the
licence fee to these areas, however, is likely to be politically unpalatable and difficult
to enforce, making its abolition the more likely outcome.  Secondly, while the licence
fee is acceptable to most people when the programmes it funds constitute the major
part of their viewing,83 this support is likely to fall in line with the viewing share of
the public broadcaster (and as increasing numbers also subscribe to pay-TV).  Ofcom
reports that ‘[t]he TV licence fee is already questioned by viewers whose use of the
BBC’s services is declining’,84 while survey evidence suggests that the majority of
viewers regard the licence fee as no longer justified in a multi-channel environment.85
As Gavyn Davies predicted a few years ago:86
‘the digital age will increasingly be one in which many or most consumers of
television pay for packages closely tailored to their needs.  As they become
more accustomed to choice, to subscription and to pay-per-view, it could be
that the licence fee will come to seem an anachronism.’ 
If correct this analysis implies that the licence fee as well as commercial funding of
PSB is undermined in the digital world.  Funds might instead be provided out of
                                                                                                                                           
81 MacTaggart lecture at the Edinburgh International Television Festival, 27 August 1999.
82 Ofcom (2004a) reports that the most popular programmes on analogue terrestrial in the UK could
expect audiences of some 16-17 million viewers in the late 1990s, but by 2003, 14 million was a
typical ceiling.
83 Although the need to retain public support by giving them entertaining programmes creates some
tension with PSB objectives.
84 See Ofcom (2004a) page 8; also Figure 44.
85 A YouGov poll conducted for the Telegraph in October 2002 showed that 58 per cent of those
surveyed believed the current system to be no longer justified in a multi-channel world. (The
Telegraph, ‘Unwanted licence fee’, 28 October 2002.)
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general taxation, although this too requires political support and in practice the
amount involved is likely to be much more limited.  If multiple providers are to be
retained, public funds must be made available to commercial as well as public
broadcasters, perhaps through a competitive commissioning system.
The scope of public broadcasters
A further problem arises from the blurring of the boundary between the activities of
public broadcasters and those of commercial operators.  In an analogue setting where
purely commercial broadcasters would fail to generate the kinds of programmes that
viewers desire, the role of public broadcasters in fulfilling viewer demands was
uncontroversial.  But now that the commercial sector is capable of meeting these
demands, the activities of public broadcasters are increasingly in conflict with this.
With licence fee funding given to public broadcasters alone, commercial broadcasters
complain of unfair competition and crowding out.  Whether this is detrimental to
welfare depends on the relative efficiencies of the broadcasters and the attractiveness
to viewers of their respective services, but the distortion of competition is likely to
generate some inefficiency.  
To tackle this problem, a tighter definition of the role of public service broadcasters,
limiting this to areas that the commercial sector would not otherwise provide, is
advisable.  Licence fee funds (if the licence fee is retained) would also need to be
ring-fenced, and potentially made available to other broadcasters if they produce
programmes to fulfil public purposes.
8. Public service broadcasting in the UK
As a case study, we describe the system of public service broadcasting in the UK.
This regime was developed in the analogue era, with its origins dating back to the
1920s (initially for radio broadcasting).  It now faces pressure from digitisation: many
households have already adopted digital television, and digital switchover (i.e. turning
off the analogue signal) is due to be completed by the end of 2012.  
The section has two main parts: first we describe in detail the purposes stated for PSB
in the UK and its current system of provision, relating these features to the analysis of
Section 6.  Secondly, we discuss threats to the future sustainability of this system with
the onset of digital broadcasting.
8.1 The UK’s public service broadcasting system
The purposes of the UK’s brand of public service broadcasting are defined under the
Communications Act 2003 (hereafter ‘the Act’).  Section 264(4) of the Act provides
general statements of purpose, while detailed elements are specified in Section
264(6).  The full text of the latter is set out in Box 4.  In addition to the kinds of public
                                                                                                                                           
86 Davies (1999), Section 5, page 144.
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service obligations described in this chapter, the remit includes an element of national
and regional industrial policy; see Section 264(6)(j).87
      Box 4: PSB under the Communications Act 2003
 264(6) A manner of fulfilling the purposes of public service television broadcasting in the
 United Kingdom is compatible with this subsection if it ensures-
(a) that the relevant television services (taken together) comprise a public service for the
dissemination of information and for the provision of education and entertainment;
(b) that cultural activity in the United Kingdom, and its diversity, are reflected, supported
and stimulated by the representation in those services (taken together) of drama,
comedy and music, by the inclusion of feature films in those services and by the
treatment of other visual and performing arts;
(c) that those services (taken together) provide, to the extent that is appropriate for
facilitating civic understanding and fair and well-informed debate on news and current
affairs, a comprehensive and authoritative coverage of news and current affairs in,
and in the different parts of, the United Kingdom and from around the world;
(d) that those services (taken together) satisfy a wide range of different sporting and
other leisure interests;
(e) that those services (taken together) include what appears to OFCOM to be a suitable
quantity and range of programmes on educational matters, of programmes of an
educational nature and of other programmes of educative value;
(f) that those services (taken together) include what appears to OFCOM to be a suitable
quantity and range of programmes dealing with each of the following, science,
religion and other beliefs, social issues, matters of international significance or
interest and matters of specialist interest;
(g) that the programmes included in those services that deal with religion and other
beliefs include-
(i) programmes providing news and other information about different religions and
other beliefs;
(ii) programmes about the history of different religions and other beliefs; and
(iii) programmes showing acts of worship and other ceremonies and practices
(including some showing acts of worship and other ceremonies in their entirety);
(h) that those services (taken together) include what appears to OFCOM to be a suitable
quantity and range of high quality and original programmes for children and young
people;
(i) that those services (taken together) include what appears to OFCOM to be a
sufficient quantity of programmes that reflect the lives and concerns of different
communities and cultural interests and traditions within the United Kingdom, and
locally in different parts of the United Kingdom;
(j) that those services (taken together), so far as they include programmes made in the
United Kingdom, include what appears to OFCOM to be an appropriate range and
proportion of programmes made outside the M25 area.
Examining the stated purposes of PSB in the light of the analysis presented in Section
6, the following features can be noted.  A diverse range of programme types is
specified, including comedy and drama, news and current affairs, religion, the arts,
                                                
87 ‘The M25 area’ refers to the area within London’s major ring road, i.e. the Greater London region.
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sports and other leisure interests.  Moreover, ‘matters of specialist interest’ are
explicitly mentioned.  These can be interpreted as a response to the traditional market
failure resulting in insufficient programme diversity: some of these genres would
most likely be under-provided by advertising-funded broadcasters in the analogue era;
although many others seem sufficiently popular to survive without intervention.88
The breadth of this remit—explicitly stating ‘entertainment’ as a purpose of PSB—
allows the BBC (the licence fee funded public broadcaster) to show considerable
amounts of popular entertainment, especially during peak hours on its flagship
channel, BBC1.  It has also been used to justify the authorisation as PSB of new BBC
channels covering general entertainment (BBC3) and rolling news (BBC News 24), to
the dismay of commercial broadcasters.
Public service broadcasting also aims to mitigate traditional market failures regarding
quality and innovation. Section 264(4) of the Act requires the maintenance of ‘high
general standards’ in respect of programme content, production quality and editorial
integrity.  Specifying what ‘quality’ means precisely and monitoring this are difficult
however; see relevant parts of Ofcom (2004a, b; 2005).  Innovation is encouraged,
most notably in relation to Channel 4 which is required under the Act to demonstrate
‘innovation, experiment and creativity in the form and content of programmes’; as for
quality, this is difficult to regulate.  
The UK’s historic PSB system, consisting of monopoly provision by a single public
broadcaster (the BBC), provided poor incentives for innovation.  The main spur to
innovation has tended to come from competition, not always from desirable or legal
sources.89  The recognition that competition could be beneficial led to the licensing of
ITV (Channel 3) in 1955, and subsequently Channels 4 and 5.  This has stimulated
innovation somewhat, although both BBC and ITV have been criticised for lack of
originality and use of derivative formats.90
Educational programmes and those ‘of educative value’ are included among the
purposes of PSB under the Act.  Coverage of news and current affairs must be
comprehensive and authoritative, ‘facilitating civic understanding and fair and well-
informed debate’.  Programmes dealing with social issues are mentioned, as are those
‘that reflect the lives and concerns of different communities’ in the UK.  These
                                                
88 Surveys conducted for the Ofcom review of public service television broadcasting indicate that
several elements of PSB output are popular, with viewers placing a high value on their own
consumption of news, serious factual programmes and drama, as well as entertainment; see Ofcom
(2004a), Figure 33.
89 For example, in the early days of the Second World War some UK radio listeners found the Nazi
propagandist Lord Haw Haw more entertaining than the BBC’s austere diet of organ recitals and
public announcements.  This prompted the BBC to lighten its tone with a new emphasis on
entertainment.  In the 1960s, the BBC’s failure to respond to changing music tastes led to the
growth of pirate radio stations, culminating in harsh enforcement action—and also the launch of a
new BBC station, Radio 1.
90 See, for example, the findings presented in Ofcom (2004a).
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specifications would seem to reflect various positive externalities associated with
television: education, social concerns and the building of community understanding.
Certain exclusionary controls apply to television broadcasting.  Advertising ceilings
are placed on broadcasters to counter the bias toward excessive advertising in a free-
to-air system.91  The BBC provides its channels advertising-free, motivated in part by
the threat posed to editorial freedom from reliance on advertising revenue; though it
should be noted that this may result in under-provision compared with the welfare (as
opposed to viewer) optimum.  Controls also exist on the broadcasting of potentially
harmful material, in the form of broadcasting codes.
Turning now to provision, the UK’s is a licensing system.  Licences are awarded to a
number of broadcasters,92 including both statutory (i.e. public) corporations (the BBC,
Channel 4 and S4C) and commercial companies (the Channel 3 licensees, known
collectively as ‘ITV’, Five and Teletext).  Licences specify programme obligations
(which vary between broadcasters) and are awarded for a number of years (the BBC’s
charter is typically renewed for ten years).  Key facts about each public service
broadcaster are summarised in Table 1; further details and historical background are
contained in Appendix 2.
In return for programme obligations public service broadcasters are granted funding
concessions, either a guaranteed revenue stream (the licence fee or government grant),
or gifted spectrum from which advertising revenues are earned.  Revenue from the
licence fee, set at £126.50 per annum for a household in 2005-06, goes entirely to the
BBC.  All public service broadcasters hold gifted spectrum, for which the commercial
licensees (the ‘ITV’ franchisees and Five) pay annual licence fees to the government,
though lower amounts than would be paid in a purely commercial system.93  As
public bodies Channel 4 and S4C pay no licence fees; S4C also receives a grant from
the government and some programming from the BBC.
The public service broadcasters operate the only analogue channels, while on digital
platforms they compete with other, fully commercial broadcasters.94  The BBC offers
six digital-only channels in addition to its two analogue ones.  All PSB channels are
                                                
91 Advertising ceilings are specified under the EU Television Without Frontiers directive.
92 The BBC has a Royal Charter rather than a licence.  The remaining public service broadcasters are
licensed under the Communications Act 2003.
93 Channel 3 (‘ITV’) licences were auctioned following the 1990 Broadcasting Act.  Renewal fees
for these and the Channel 5 licence (held by Five) are determined by Ofcom.  In 2004 the licensees
collectively paid £230million.  This is expected to fall to around £90million in 2005, reflecting the
falling scarcity value of analogue spectrum resulting from the growth of digital households.
94 Digital satellite, operated by BSkyB, has near-universal coverage.  There are two regional cable
companies, NTL and Telewest, passing approximately 50% of homes.  Digital terrestrial television
(DTT) has less than universal coverage but this is increasing, with a view towards digital
switchover around 2012.  Following the demise of ITV Digital in March 2002, Freeview, an
umbrella platform for various free-to-air channels, was launched in October 2002.  A limited pay-
TV service, Top Up TV, was launched in March 2004.
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shown on the cable and satellite platforms under must-carry/must-provide regulations.  
   Table 1: UK public service broadcasters
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8.2 The impact of digital broadcasting
With the growth of digital broadcasting the UK’s system of PSB is facing a number of
distinct but related threats to its long-term sustainability:
• public acceptance of the licence fee is in decline as more households adopt
multi-channel TV;
• spectrum rents used to provide implicit subsidies to advertising-funded public
service broadcasters are diminishing; and
• for commercial broadcasters, acceptance of programme obligations in return
for gifted spectrum may prove unattractive close to digital switchover (even if
some spectrum rents remain).
As discussed in Section 7, acceptance of a compulsory licence fee appears to fall as
households adopt multi-channel (especially pay-) TV and their viewing of BBC
channels declines.  The BBC has recently been criticised by some for ‘dumbing
down’ its output and engaging in ratings wars with ITV, in an attempt to maintain its
popularity.  Now faced with renewal of its charter in 2007, the BBC has changed tack
with a campaign to define its role as the promoter of ‘public value’.95  If the current
level of licence fee funding cannot be defended and its public service role is to be
maintained, the BBC may eventually need to raise revenue by alternative means (e.g.
subscription) or be given funds from general taxation.
                                                
95 See BBC (2004).
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The licence obligations of the other public service broadcasters are funded by means
of analogue spectrum concessions.  ITV plc, the largest of the commercial public
service broadcasters, has estimated its additional programming costs at around £250m
per annum.96  As digitisation relaxes spectrum constraints and competitive entry takes
place, the rents used to fund PSB obligations are being eroded.97  Ultimately, as these
rents disappear, programme obligations must either be removed (and hence public
service broadcasting largely abandoned, except by the BBC98), or subsidised out of
public funds.
A further issue arises for the commercial public service broadcasters (the Channel 3
licensees and Five).  As shareholder-controlled firms looking to maximise returns,
their willingness to participate in PSB cannot be taken for granted (as it can for the
BBC, Channel 4 and S4C).  These companies have the option of abandoning (or not
seeking to renew) their PSB licences, and instead undertaking purely commercial
broadcasting on digital terrestrial and other platforms (although not on analogue
terrestrial, for which spectrum is available only through the PSB licences).  The
relative return to the two modes of broadcasting is crucial to this decision.  With
costly PSB obligations, they will participate only if the benefits of PSB, relative to the
commercial alternative, exceed this cost.  
As noted above, digitisation undermines the value of spectrum concessions granted to
public service broadcasters.  Another possible benefit of participation in PSB is ‘due
prominence’ on electronic programme guides (EPGs) given to PSB channels.  But
although EPG positioning is important to broadcasters since this allows their channels
to be found more easily,99 prominence might be obtained in other ways.100  In any
case, this value is unlikely to be sufficient to sustain a lot of costly PSB obligations.
A further incentive for continued participation over the next few years is that, until
digital switchover, PSB licences retain a value from linkages between analogue and
digital viewing.  As well as carrying their existing analogue audiences over to the
digital platform, giving these channels an inherited advantage in the digital world,
                                                
96 From The Times, ‘ITV unveils strategy for digital fightback’, 24 June 2004.
97 In practical terms, the audiences and advertising revenues of advertising-funded public service
channels are coming under pressure.  Concern has already been raised over the future viability of
Channel 4 (see ‘Preserving C4’s provision’, Financial Times, 19 April 2004, written by Mark
Thompson, then Chief Executive of Channel 4).  Although S4C also sells advertising, the major
part of its funding comes from a government grant and it is therefore largely protected from this
threat.
98 The concern that public service output on advertising-funded channels will eventually disappear
underlies Ofcom’s proposal to create a ‘Public Service Publisher’ (PSP) to compete with the BBC.
A public funding source would be needed for this body, however, with the practical options being
limited to top-slicing licence fee revenue (assuming that the licence fee itself can be defended) or a
grant out of taxation.
99 EPG positioning has been the subject of several disputes between broadcasters, including the
positioning of BBC channels on the satellite EPG and of Top-Up TV’s channels on the digital
terrestrial EPG.
100 For example, EPG rankings by viewing shares would place the existing analogue channels at or
close to the top of the list due to their inherited base of viewers.  
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broadcasters can (and do) use airtime on their analogue channels to cross-promote
their digital services, and thus increase viewing shares for all their digital channels.
Until digital switchover becomes imminent, commercial broadcasters are unlikely to
want to abandon their PSB licences.
Although it is unclear precisely how these calculations stack up, serious threats to the
long-term sustainability of ITV1, Channel 4 and Five as PSB channels must be
recognised.  Under the worst case scenario the BBC will be left as the only significant
provider of PSB.  Moreover, with support for the television licence fee in decline,
even the BBC’s position cannot be seen as unassailable.
Although it may be possible to prop up the PSB system, perhaps by increasing direct
public funding and spreading this between a wider range of providers, it must be
questioned whether this is actually worthwhile.  Market provision in the digital world
is far less prone to traditional market failures, and will supply broadly the
programmes that viewers wish to watch.  Although remaining externality and
‘citizenship’ concerns provide a rationale for on-going, but much more limited, public
intervention, the weakening of broadcasters’ ability to ensure that public service
material is actually watched undermines the effectiveness of such intervention.  It
would not be unreasonable to conclude that, given the declining benefits and major
costs of intervening in this market, including the distortion to competition due to the
presence of a state-funded broadcaster, the time has now come when large-scale
intervention is no longer appropriate.
9. Conclusion
To conclude, we put forward key messages from our analysis for students, researchers
and policymakers.  
Messages for students
For the student, the following conclusions may be drawn from this chapter.
• Advertising-funded broadcasting is prone to a number of market failures.  In
particular:
- an insufficiently diverse range of programme genres is produced;
- programme quality is too low;
- innovation incentives are weak; and
- the airtime devoted to advertising tends to be excessive, especially if its
nuisance cost to viewers is high.  This is a form of allocative inefficiency.
• When broadcasters can charge viewers (i.e. in pay-TV) these biases are largely
mitigated.  Compared with advertising-funded broadcasting:
- a diverse range of programme genres is produced, satisfying the breadth of
viewers’ tastes;
- quality is higher, and broadly appropriate to viewers’ willingness-to-pay;
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- incentives to invest in innovative programming are higher;
- fewer adverts are shown, benefiting viewers but harming advertisers; and
- price discrimination through channel bundling can mitigate inefficient
exclusion of viewers.
• Spectrum scarcity in analogue broadcasting creates a barrier to entry, limiting
competition and generating scarcity rents.  Digital technologies relax spectrum
constraints and facilitate competitive entry, eliminating rents.
• A number of externalities are cited for television broadcasting, both positive
and negative.
Messages for researchers
There is a long literature on the economics of broadcasting, stretching back almost 60
years.  We have drawn on many of these papers in this chapter.  Even so, a number of
important questions call out for further research, especially empirical investigation.
• To what extent is excess entry a significant issue in digital broadcasting?
• How can the ‘quality’ of television programmes (in the sense defined in
Section 3 of this chapter) be measured?  What underlying factors does it
depend on?
• As the ownership and use of personal video recorders becomes widespread, to
what extent do people use its enhanced capabilities to avoid advertising in
television?  What is the impact on advertising revenue?  Can we infer from
such behaviour the disutility of advertising for viewers?
• Can robust evidence be gathered about the relationship between television
viewing and individual behaviour?  What are the behavioural effects of
television viewing in general?  What are the behavioural effects of viewing
specific types of programming?
• Can the various externalities cited for broadcasting be quantified?
Messages for policymakers
The future of public service broadcasting has been the focus of recent policy debate in
the UK.  The UK is currently in a period of transition between analogue and digital
broadcasting: the number of homes that have adopted digital television is steadily
increasing,101 and digital switchover is due to be completed by 2012.  Thus, the
impact of digitisation on public service broadcasting needs to be recognised and
addressed in the near future.  As a contribution to this debate, both in the UK and
elsewhere, we put forward the following recommendations for policymakers:
• Public service broadcasting systems in countries such as the UK were coherent
responses to the market failures inherent in advertising-funded broadcasting,
                                                
101 As of end March 2005, 61.9% of UK households were capable of receiving digital television
(Ofcom, The Communications Market 2005, Section 4.2.1). 
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and thus were relevant in the analogue era.  Digital broadcasting is less prone
to traditional market failures and will supply the programmes that viewers
broadly wish to watch.  With this development, the ‘market failure’ rationale
for PSB largely falls away.
• The remaining rationale for public intervention is linked to externality and
‘citizenship’ concerns.  There is a case for continued intervention, but of more
limited form and at a scale appropriate to the magnitude of these externalities.
• Although wider benefits of public service content may merit intervention, the
ability to ensure actual viewing of programmes that do not appeal directly to
the viewer’s own preferences is increasingly constrained in the digital world.
If public service messages are to gain viewer attention, methods similar to
‘product placement’ may be required.  If significant audiences cannot be
captured, policymakers should reconsider whether continued intervention is
appropriate.
• Relaxation of spectrum constraints will eliminate the rents currently used as an
implicit source of funding for part of the UK’s public service output.  One
possibility is to replace this amount with public funds.  But raising the level of
public funding at a time when the rationale for, and effectiveness of, PSB is
declining would be highly questionable.
Appendix 1: A duopoly model of programme quality
This appendix presents the formal model discussed in Section 3.  There are two
broadcasters, A and B, each supplying a single channel.102  Suppose that over the
relevant period each viewer watches a single channel.  There is an exogenous level of
horizontal product differentiation between the two channels: if broadcaster i supplies










where t > 0 measures the exogenous degree of channel differentiation and uj is utility
provided by the rival broadcaster.  Utility ui is made up of three ingredients:
i i i iu v n pδ= − − ,
                                                
102 The following model is similar to Anderson and Coate (2005) except that here the quality of
programmes is chosen by the broadcasters.  For related theoretical models of competition between
broadcasters, see Crampes et al. (2005) and Peitz and Valletti (2004).  The former paper, which
has exogenous programme quality, examines a free-entry model of broadcasting (or media more
generally) and also allows the advertising revenue function to be non-linear (unlike the model
described in this appendix).  The second paper models (duopoly) broadcasters as choosing the
degree of horizontal differentiation, i.e. the degree of programme diversity, rather than (vertical)
programme quality.
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where vi is the endogenous quality of the broadcaster’s output, ni is the number of
adverts shown on the channel, and pi is the subscription charge (if any).  The
parameter δ represents the perceived nuisance of adverts to viewers.  Suppose that a
broadcaster’s advertising revenue is proportional to its audience.  More precisely,
suppose that if a broadcaster chooses a quantity of advertising n it receives advertising
revenue R(n) per viewer.  Assume that there are decreasing returns to the number of
adverts shown, in the sense that R(·) is a concave function.  A broadcaster can choose
its quality vi by incurring the quadratic fixed cost γvi2/2.  There are no other costs
involved in delivering programmes to viewers.  In sum, the profit of broadcaster i is
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We next analyse the outcomes of this model, first in the case where broadcasters can
charge directly for viewing, and then when broadcasters must rely on advertising
revenue alone to fund their operations.
Pay TV regime
One can show that broadcaster i’s profit in (1) is concave in (pi, vi) if and only if
4 1tγ > , (2)
and this is assumed henceforth.  (If this condition does not hold, then there is no
market sharing equilibrium, and a channel wishes to corner the market for viewers by
setting a high quality level.)
Since i i i ip v u nδ= − − , broadcaster i’s profit in expression (1) can be written as
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Therefore, it is a dominant strategy (i.e., regardless of the broadcaster’s chosen level
of utility ui) for each broadcaster to choose the advertising intensity n1, where
n1 maximises R(n) – δn. (3)
Given market share si, which is determined by the two broadcasters’ choices of
utilities ui and uj, firm i’s most profitable choice of quality is given by vi = si/γ.  Thus,
when subscription charges are used, private and social incentives to supply quality
coincide, and broadcasters supply the socially optimal level of programme quality
given the size of their audience.  (This result is an artefact of the assumption that all
viewers have the same preferences about programme quality.)  
One can calculate that the symmetric equilibrium subscription price and quality are
respectively given by
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1 1( )p t R n= −  ; 1 12v γ= . (4)
Note from (4) that if R(n1) > t then firms would like to charge a negative price for
viewing: the revenue from advertising is so great that firms wish to pay viewers to
watch.  Since this outcome is not likely to be feasible in practice, we impose a non-
negativity constraint on subscription prices.  With this assumption, if parameters are
such that R(n1) > t then the regime of ‘pay-TV’ collapses to the free-to-air advertising-
funding regime, since firms do not charge viewers (even though they could).
Therefore, differences between the two regimes only exist when
1( )R n t< (5)
and this is assumed henceforth.
Broadcasters break even if and only if the concavity condition (2) is satisfied, in
which case the industry profit is t – 1/(4γ).  Notice that this equilibrium profit is
increasing in γ, the cost of making better programmes.  (Of course, keeping a rival
broadcaster’s actions fixed, one broadcaster’s profits will decrease if its cost γ rises.
However, when each firm’s cost rises, there is a strategic effect that softens
competition, and the net effect in this model is for equilibrium profits to rise.)
One policy intervention that would increase viewer surplus (but not overall welfare) is
to require channels to raise the quality of their programmes above the equilibrium
level of v = 1/(2γ).  As long as this does not cause the channels to go bankrupt, it has
no effect on the prices offered to viewers.  Of course, however, programme quality is
something that is intrinsically hard to regulate.
Finally, consider the effect of advertising becoming impossible (say, due to the
widespread adoption of PVRs).  In this model, the only effect is to increase the price
to viewers, and programme quality is not affected.  Viewers are strictly worse off: the
increase in price outweighs a viewer’s benefit of not having to watch adverts.  The
equilibrium level of advertising in expression (3) describes a viewer’s ideal amount of
advertising, given that the revenue from advertising is passed on to the viewer in the
form of a reduced subscription charge.  A similar point is that, in the pay-TV regime,
there is no argument (even from the perspective of viewers alone) for regulation that
places a ceiling on the amount of advertising that broadcasters show. 
Advertising-funded TV
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(This is just expression (1) with the subscription prices set equal to zero.)  The first-
















From (3), (5) and (7) we have
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By concavity, the function R′/R is decreasing in n, and so we deduce that there is less
advertising in the pay-TV regime than in the advertising-funded regime.
Since n2 > n1 it follows by concavity that R′(n2) < R′(n1) = δ, and so expression (6)
demonstrates that R(n2) < t.  This inequality implies that quality v2 in (7) is lower than
in the pay-TV regime, when quality was given by v1 = 1/(2γ).  Of course, in the case
of advertising-funded television, the widespread adoption of PVRs would most likely
prove fatal.
We must check that broadcasters break even in this model with advertising funding.
Industry profits are
2 2
2 2 2 2
( )( ) ( ) 1
4
R nR n v R n
t
γ γ
⎛ ⎞− = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,
where the equality follows from (7).  Notice that these profits are ‘inverse-U’ shaped
in advertising revenue: too little advertising revenue obviously leads to low profits,
but too much revenue causes firms to compete very hard for viewers by offering high
quality programmes, and this drives down profits.  As in the pay-TV regime, the
broadcasters’ profits are increasing with γ.  The above expression shows that profits
are positive provided that R(n2) < 4γt2.  However, we have just shown that R(n2) < t,
and so a sufficient condition for this is that 4γt > 1, which is exactly the condition (2)
that ensures that the broadcasters break even in the pay-TV regime.  Therefore,
whenever broadcasters break even in the pay-TV regime they will also break even
when they must rely on advertising alone.  (Note that we are not suggesting that
profits are higher with free-to-air broadcasting; in many cases they will not be.)
49
Comparison of viewer surplus
Finally, we can compare viewer surplus in the two funding regimes.  First, consider
the case of exogenously fixed programme quality v (or, equivalently, the case of very
large γ).  In this case, viewers in the pay-TV regime have utility
    1 1 1( )u v R n t nδ= + − −   (8)
whereas in the free-to-air regime, viewer utility is
2 2u v nδ= − .      (9)
When t < R(n1) the two regimes coincide if negative prices are not feasible.  When t =
R(n1) one can check that n1 = n2 and so expressions (8) and (9) are equal.  Next,
consider the effect on the two utilities of raising t above R(n1).  Clearly, from
expression (8) we have du1/dt = -1.  However, by differentiating expression (6) it
follows from (9) that du2/dt ≥ -1.  We deduce that for t > R(n1), i.e., in all situations
where the two funding regimes are different, viewers are worse off in the pay-TV
regime when programme quality is fixed.  The benefit that viewers obtain from seeing
fewer adverts is outweighed by the extra price they must pay to subscribe.
The effect of making programme quality endogenous, however, can reverse viewer
preferences over the two regimes.  Take the linear example where R(n) = αn and
where α < δ.  In this case, a pay-TV channel (which chooses n1 to maximise R(n) - δn)




u tγ= −  .
A free-to-air channel will, from (6) and (7), choose
2
tn δ=  ; 2 2v
α
δγ=
which yields a lower viewer utility: u2 < u1.  Thus, in this case, the higher quality
programmes in the pay-TV regime more than compensate viewers for the higher price
they pay to watch programmes.
To summarise the main results derived in this duopoly model: 
• compared to the pay-TV regime, advertising-funded broadcasting involves
lower quality programmes and more adverts; and
• viewers are better off in a free-to-air regime if there is little scope for affecting
programme quality, while they are better off in a pay-TV regime otherwise.
Appendix 2: Public service broadcasters in the UK
The UK has five public service television broadcasters: the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), the ITV network (properly known as Channel 3), Channel 4
(except in Wales), S4C (in Wales only) and Five.  A TV-based information service,
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Teletext, is also licensed as a public service broadcaster.  These broadcasters are
subject to explicit programming and production obligations in relation to their PSB
channels, in return for either a guaranteed funding stream or gifted spectrum from
which advertising and sponsorship revenues may be earned.  Along with all other
broadcasters they must also meet basic standards of taste and decency, accuracy and
impartiality required of all broadcasters. 
There are several important differences in the nature and funding of the various public
service broadcasters.  These are detailed as follows.
The BBC 
The BBC is a statutory corporation.  It was founded as the British Broadcasting
Company in 1922 by a group of wireless manufacturers to transmit radio (rather than
television) broadcasts.  In 1927 it received its first Royal Charter and became the
British Broadcasting Corporation.  It began television broadcasts in 1936.  Its current
Charter is up for renewal in 2006. The BBC is largely self-governing, with various
regulatory functions being in the hands of its own Governors.
The BBC’s PSB channels and services are funded from a licence fee of £126.50 per
annum (in 2005-06) paid by every TV household (with concessions for those aged
over 75 and the blind).  This raises annual revenues for the BBC of £2.94bn a year (in
2004-05).  In addition, the BBC’s income from its commercial businesses totalled
£151m in 2004-05.  The BBC operates two analogue channels, BBC1 and BBC2.  It
has a further six digital PSB channels, shown free-to-air: BBC3, BBC4, BBC News
24, BBC Parliament and the children’s channels CBeebies and CBBC.  It also has a
text information service, Ceefax, which started transmission in 1974.
Channel 3 (‘ITV’)
Channel 3, generally known as ITV, was established in 1955.  It is a network of 15
distinct regional licences, each with its own set of public service obligations designed
to reflect the particular character of the region.  ITV plc, formed by the merger of
Carlton and Granada in February 2004, owns the eleven Channel 3 licences in
England and Wales.  Scottish Media Group (SMG plc) holds the two licences for
Scotland, while Ulster Television plc and Channel Television Ltd hold one licence
each, for Northern Ireland and the Channel Islands respectively.  There is also a
national licence for breakfast-time TV, held by GMTV Ltd. 
The Channel 3 licensees are shareholder-controlled companies.  They benefit from
gifted spectrum and pay licence fees to the government.  The Channel 3 network’s
PSB channel, ITV1, is advertising funded.  It is licensed under Section 216 of the
Communications Act 2003, which sets out its PSB obligations and provides for both
analogue and digital transmission, and is regulated by Ofcom (formerly by the
Independent Television Commission, ITC).  Over 90% of the programmes shown on
ITV1 are common across the regional licence areas: these are coordinated through the
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ITV Network Centre, which commissions and schedules programmes for broadcast
over the network as a whole.  There is a small element of regional programming in
each area, as required under the licences.
In addition to ITV1, there are currently three further ITV channels: ITV2 and IV3,
which are wholly owned by ITV plc, and ITV News.  These channels are available on
digital platforms only, and are outside the public service broadcasting system.
Channel 4
Channel 4, along with S4C in Wales (see below), was created by Act of Parliament in
1982.  C4C (the Channel 4 Corporation) is a statutory corporation, headed by a board
appointed by Ofcom in agreement with the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and
Sport.  It receives no public funds, being funded from its own advertising revenue and
other commercial activities. 
Channel 4 is required under the Communications Act 2003 to provide of a broad
range of high quality and diverse programming which: demonstrates innovation,
experimentation and creativity; appeals to the tastes and interests of a culturally
diverse society; includes programmes of an educational nature; and exhibits a
distinctive character.  It is a commissioning broadcaster, not a producer, purchasing
its programming from over 300 independent production companies across the UK. 
In addition to its PSB channel, the Channel Four Group also operates two pay-TV
channels: E4, a general entertainment channel, and FilmFour, a specialist film
channel.  The FilmFour division produces and co-produces feature films for the UK
and global markets.
S4C
S4C (Sianel Pedwar Cymru, or ‘Channel Four Wales’), is a statutory corporation
established in 1982 (alongside Channel 4) to broadcast in Wales.  It is regulated by
the Welsh Authority, whose chair and members are appointed by the Secretary of
State for Culture, Media and Sport in consultation with the National Assembly for
Wales.  It has the distinctive role as public service broadcaster to the bilingual
community in Wales, with Welsh language broadcasts an important part of its remit.
It is supported by a government grant (£85.7m in 2004) in addition to its own
advertising revenues, and receives some programming from the BBC provided using
licence fee funding. 
Like Channel 4, S4C is a commissioning broadcaster, not a producer.  During peak
hours (18:00-22:00) the majority of its output must be in the Welsh language; in total
it carries an average of 32 hours of Welsh language programming each week.  Of this,
ten hours a week is provided by the BBC while the rest is commissioned from
independent producers including the local ITV franchise, HTV (part of ITV plc). The
rest of S4C’s output is English language programming from Channel 4, over 70% of
whose output is shown on S4C, usually rescheduled.
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Five
Channel 5 (now rebranded as ‘Five’) was launched in March 1997.  It has restricted
coverage (its analogue signal reaches around 82% of UK homes, though this is being
expanded by digital coverage) and inferior picture quality in some areas due to low
transmission power.  It is a shareholder-controlled company, majority owned by RTL/
Bertelsmann, and is funded from sales of advertising airtime.  It has very little in-
house production, relying mainly on original commissions and acquired
programming.
Teletext
Teletext provides the analogue text services on ITV1, Channel 4 and Five.  Teletext is
also available on digital TV, the Internet and mobile phones.  The first full text
services, BBC Ceefax and Oracle (operated by ITV), began transmission in 1974.
Teletext, an independent franchise, took over from Oracle at the start of 1993.
Teletext Ltd. is a commercial organisation owned by Harmsworth Media (a subsidiary
of the Daily Mail and General Trust) and Media Ventures International.
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